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Viljenka ŠKORJANEC, Osimska pogajanja [Die Verhandlungen von Osimo]. Koper: Založba Annales 2007. 382 S., ISBN 978-961-6033-97-8, € 19,-

On 10th November 1975 the Italian and Yugoslav foreign ministers Mariano Rumor and Miloš Minić met at the Villa Leopardi Dittaiuti of Monte San Pietro in the vicinity of Osimo (Ancona, Marche region, Italy) where they signed a treaty which marked the end of a border contention that originated after the Yugoslav occupation of Trieste and the Venezia Giulia in May 1945. After the Paris Peace Treaty of 10th February 1947 Italy lost sovereignty over the Venezia Giulia region, handed over to Yugoslavia, except its capital city Trieste. Together with its surroundings and a small part of Istria it became an internationalized territory labelled “Free Territory of Trieste” (FTT) divided into a zone “A” governed under the allied military administration and “B” under the Yugoslav army. With the London protocol of 9th May 1952 it was agreed to transfer the civil administration of Trieste to the Italian functionaries ending the military allied administration of the zone “A” of the FTT. After another turn of secret negotiations all parts (without the Soviets) produced in February 1954 in London a “Memorandum of intents” where the zone A was abandoned and left to the Italian civil administration while the zone B to the Yugoslav thereby ending the regime of military administration for both zones. Since Italy did not accept the loss of sovereignty upon the zone B of the FTT, the border between the two states remained provisory until the Osimo agreement became executable on the 11th October 1977, after the ratification by the Italian and Yugoslav legislative chambers. The result for the Italians was a net loss, since they gave up sovereignty upon the Zone B (the district of Koper in Slovenia and the district of Buje in Croatia) without compensation.

Anticipating the outcome, Italy requested that the negotiations remain secret. Eugenio Carbone, then Director General of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, carried on almost single-handedly the negotiations from the Italian side, working with Boris Šnuderl who, after having served as justice minister of Yugoslavia, was the Yugoslav federal executive for economic relations with the West (359). The two already knew each other and apparently it was Carbone who officially requested Šnuderl as his counterpart (53, 291). Secrecy kept the Italians in a prisoner’s dilemma – Carbone informed only episodically the highest state executives (president Leone, prime minister Andreotti, and foreign minister Moro) about the course of the negotiations, while the Yugoslavs coordinated their efforts. Šnuderl reported on a daily base to the executives of the Slovene League of Communists but less often to the federal party or government organs. It seems that with Tito’s consent Yugoslav central authorities had a subsidiary function (141). Even Miloš Minić had to rely entirely upon the Slovene party executives (290). The first and crucial secret meetings were organised in Slovenia at the castle of Strmol a site used for confidential gatherings of the Slovene Communist Party. Later meetings took place in Dubrovnik and in Strunjan and, finally, the act was signed in Osimo, in a solitary villa chosen for its supreme view of the Adriatic sea (199), perhaps to prevent civil unrest given the opposition to the Treaty (once its content was made public) by Italian nationalist political forces (191).

The Italians requested the establishment of a Free Zone behind Trieste on Yugoslav territory for the industrial development of Trieste as a *conditio sine qua non* for reaching an

agreement with the Yugoslavs. Economic conditions become a compensation for the loss of sovereignty over the Zone B. Šnuderl promptly recognised that this had to bluff the Italian parliament and public opinion (78), and by that he also successfully imposed the relocation of the industrial zone from the initial Italian proposal (85). Moreover, Šnuderl added the protection of the Slovene minority in Italy as an integral part of the negotiation package as Yugoslav condition for accepting the Free Zone (293). In this way what was to be a border settlement become a rather complex treaty. The Agreement on the development of economic co-operation was registered by Italy only on 9 July 1987.

The proposed Free Zone ignited opposition in Trieste where the public opinion was mobilised with the fear of an artificial Yugoslav satellite town in close proximity of the city thereby forcing the Italian government to abandon the project. The Slovene minority protection, although never enacted by the Italian regional government in Trieste (where it should be implemented), was a triumph for the Yugoslavs (and today the Slovenes) since it was acquired at no cost, and giving an argument to press the Italian government for failing to comply what was ratified in Osimo. Ironically, both Šnuderl and Minić admitted in the interview at the appendix of the book that the Yugoslavs were ready to accept the treaty even if it was limited only to the border settlement (293, 306).

Miloš Minić thinks that the Treaty represented the maximum that could have been obtained from Italy (294). The Italian eagerness to settle its border issues with Yugoslavia at any cost is puzzling. According to Škorjanec, after the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and knowing the advanced age of Yugoslav president Tito, the Italian government urged to resolve all the open questions with Yugoslavia (319-320). Although this is not explicitly stated, the book suggests that some Yugoslav republics could have been baited by the Soviets by promising them some disputed territories with Italy (260). Miloš Minić, at the 18th session of the Yugoslav federal presidency in Brioni, stated that, after the Greek defection from NATO in 1974, endemic political instability in Italy was not to be tolerated by the US (113). At the same meeting Tito stated that American direct pressure could push the Italians to sign a treaty with Yugoslavia (117). In fact in August 1975, a few days after the Treaty was initialised by Carbone and Šnuderl, a delegation consisting of eleven members of the US Congress visited Yugoslavia and it was in Ljubljana where they had the most active part of the visit (179-180). American pressures exerted upon Italy were mentioned also by Carbone to Šnuderl already at their first meeting in Portorož on March the 4th 1973 (70).

Tito's death in 1980 weakened the Slovene position in the Federation and the Italian opposition to the free zone fell on a fertile ground since the Croats were envious for the substantial advantages it assured to Slovenia (253). The Yugoslavs attempted to capitalize what they achieved at Osimo: the Macedonian Lazar Mojsov proposed a similar package to Greece for the local Slavic minority and Šnuderl contacted Josef Staribacher (the Austrian federal Minister for Trade and Industry) to start secret negotiations for improving the position of the Slovenes in Carinthia. Both attempts were met with fierce opposition in Greece and Austria: for Kreisky signing such an agreement would have been political suicide. Šnuderl thinks that by adopting an approach similar to that of Osimo, in 1992 or 1993, Slovenia could have settled its maritime border with Croatia (308). Arguably, it

seems that such a deal was possible only in Tudjman's era, characterised by international weakness and the near absence of internal opposition in Croatia.

The bargaining position of Tito's Yugoslavia during the Cold War was stronger than that of Slovenia today, and any new agreement with Italy could at the end pay the tribute for this state of affairs (268-269). According to Škorjanec, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the defence of the Treaty had to be the paramount goal of Slovene foreign policy, but this was not always understood by its top executives. Slovenian political parties, instead of putting national interest first, often pursue divergent policies, as had happened in Italy during its Cold War confrontations with Yugoslavia (275). For Slovenia the ever-present Italian attempts to amend the Treaty will be a source of difficulties for the foreseeable future Škorjanec concludes (314).¹

This is the only historical monograph on Osimo published in any language. Moreover, it also sheds light upon the style of Yugoslav diplomacy and the relations between the party elites of the Yugoslav republics in the late Tito's era. The history of the negotiations that led to the Treaty, reconstructed from Yugoslav documentation kept privately by Miloš Minić and Boris Šnuderl (14), are the most important part of the book. Both archives were donated to the author for her doctoral research from which this book is derived (14-15). Until private or public archival materials from Italy are undisclosed we shall lack other sources upon the topic, and this makes this work even more important.

Rovigno/Rovinj

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¹ Vjenka ŠKORJANEC, Die Verträge von Osimo zwischen Italien und Jugoslawien (1974/75). Ein schwieriger Verhandlungsweg, *SOF* 65/66 (2006/2007), 394-405.

Von der „europäischen Stadt“ zur „sozialistischen Stadt“ und zurück? Urbane Transformationen im östlichen Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts. Vorträge der gemeinsamen Tagung des Collegium Carolinum und des Johann Gottfried Herder-Forschungsrats in Bad Wiessee vom 23. bis 26. November 2006. Hg. Thomas BOHN. München: Oldenbourg Verlag 2009 (Bad Wiesseer Tagungen des Collegium Carolinum, 29; Völker, Staaten und Kulturen in Ostmitteleuropa, 4). 448 S., ISBN 978-3-486-58956-6, € 59,80

Was verbindet eigentlich Städte wie Belgrad, Bratislava und Brest historisch miteinander? Sicherlich gab es nach dem 2. Weltkrieg in allen Ländern des östlichen Europa einen fundamentalen sozioökonomischen Wandel unter sozialistischen Vorzeichen. Aber wie verlief denn nun die Umwandlung altherwürdiger, quasi-bürgerlicher Städte in „sozialistische Städte“, auf der ständigen Jagd parteiamtlicher Zukunftstheoretiker nach gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt und Modernität? Hat die Urbanisierung im europäischen Osten auch etwas anderes bewirkt als den Bau neuer industrieller und hochgeschossiger Ballungszentren?

Ruft man sich den städtischen Raum zwischen Harz und dem Ural, zwischen Weißem und Schwarzem Meer nach dem Ende der kommunistischen Blühträume in Erinnerung,