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Der deutsch-sowjetische Krieg 1941–1945. Geschichte und Erinnerung

Hrsg. von Jürgen Zarusky (+) und Sybille Steinbacher. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020.

292 S. = Dachauer Symposien zur Zeitgeschichte, 18. ISBN: 978-3-8353-3564-6.

This is a very German book. Based on a symposium held in 2018, it argues against the forgetfulness of the German public about the German war of extermination against the Soviet Union, 1941–45. Major themes are the Holocaust, the mass dying as well as the targeted killing of prisoners of war, deportation to slave labor, and scorched earth retreats. One section deals with everyday life (and death) under German occupation, another with the international dimensions of this war, and two with memory. With few exceptions the discussion is not integrated into the now substantial English-language literature on this war and its aftermath. The dialogue is between Germans themselves and between Germans and Russians.

Both the late JÜRGEN ZARUSKY's introduction and PETER JAHN's thoughtful chapter on German public memory since the 1980s drive home the insularity of the German debate. British and North American scholarship on this war, which advanced in parallel with the German discussion, barely ever made an impact – and where it did, it did so only if translated and mostly within the confines of academia. That this has started to change is shown by YULIYA VON SAAL's fine essay on Soviet children at war or GREGORZ ROSSOLŃSKI-LIEBE's damning chapter on the memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine, both of which are deeply steeped not only in East European historical writing but also are fully part of the English-language debate. Other highlights include SERGEI SLUCH's forensic examination of Stalin's foreign policy towards Germany, an extremely brave chapter given the already then quite repressive memory politics in Russia; and DIETER POHL's clear-eyed attempt to put the German-Soviet war into a global perspective. These contributions to the debate will prove of lasting value.

Notwithstanding such scholarly excellence, the volume is also a document from a different political epoch. After 24 February 2022, much of it reads oddly, in particular the tendency to think of this war as relevant only for “the contemporary relations between Germany and Russia”, as the title of part V defines the problematic. Why not relations to Ukraine? Or to Belarus? Or to the Baltic democracies? Timothy Snyder who tried to intervene in the German debate with the suggestion that Ukraine and its population were major targets of Germany's war against the Soviet Union, is brushed aside with the remark that Hitler did not use the word “Ukraine” in *Mein Kampf*. Hitler “always speaks of ‘Russia’”, wrote Zarusky in the introduction to the volume, “by which he meant the Soviet Union.” (pp. 28f.) That misses the point of SNYDER's exhortation that, in sharp contrast to Russia, Ukraine has “never existed as a category of German guilt” (p. 28). His intervention is thus dismissed as a politically motivated attempt to redefine the German-Soviet war “as some kind of special war against Ukraine” (p. 28). In this context, it is telling that the Russian aggression against Ukraine from 2014 is conceptualized as a “conflict between Russia and Ukraine”, as if both sides were equally to blame. This inability to stop thinking of the Soviet Union as “Russia”, and to see Germany's reactions to contemporary Russian actions through the prism of Germany's war of extermination, shapes much of the public response to Putin's aggression against Ukraine in today's Germany. It threatens to derail attempts to support a democracy against the aggression of an au-

thoritarian state. This democracy, Ukraine, is, like Russia or Belarus, a successor state of the Soviet Union. In World War II it was destroyed to an even worse extent than was Russia, which was never occupied in its entirety. Why would this Ukraine not be as central to the memory of this war as Russia? Just because Hitler saw Russia and the Soviet Union as one and the same?

While reading this book as a document of a past moment in the politics of historical memory, I wondered how German discourse about the war against the Soviet Union will change under the impact of Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine. German East European History institutes now host displaced Ukrainian scholars, which will inevitably further deepen the engagement with Ukrainian themes and sensitivities they had previously. This increased dialogue, and the widespread shock and anger about the Russian aggression, might of course lead to exactly that type of "Ukrainization" of memory and of history which Zarusky warned about. It would be very welcome if the current war makes historians more aware of the specific history of Ukraine in WWII, but it would be disastrous if we would read current political sympathies or analogies back in time. One would hope that German dialogue with Russian colleagues will continue, insofar as this will be possible given the severely authoritarian turn in Moscow. While there is a lot of work to do in the writing of the history of the German-Soviet war, as contributors to this volume rightly stress, it certainly does not need to be re-written because the politics of the present has shifted. At the same time, it is hard to see how a symposium of this kind today could not include scholars from Ukraine and treat Ukrainian themes with much more attention and subtlety. It is high time to stop thinking of the Soviet Union as "Russia," even if that is what Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*. Today, Soviet history is not just the history of Russia, but of fifteen successor states. A quarter century after the fall of the Soviet Union, historians and other intellectuals need to finally take account of that fact, in Germany as much as elsewhere.

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Den Jazz sowjetisch machen. Kulturelle Leitbilder, Musikmarkt und Distinktion zwischen 1953 und 1970

Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 2018. 532 S., 5 Abb. = Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas, 52. ISBN: 978-3-412-50115-0.

Popkultur ist seit einigen Jahren ein etabliertes Forschungsfeld in der Geschichtswissenschaft sowie der Osteuropaforschung. Die vorliegende Studie über Jazz in der Sowjetunion zwischen 1953 und 1970 ist 2016 als Dissertation an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Fach Osteuropäische Geschichte eingereicht worden und 2018 in Buchform erschienen. Die umfangreiche, quellenbasierte Forschung ist ein anregender Beitrag zur sowjetischen populären Kultur und bietet darüber hinaus weitere thematische Öffnungen in Bezug auf die Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte der Sowjet-