

Zitierhinweis

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nical rule longest – and ending it most violently. (No consideration is given to Albania.) Altrichter makes good use of the SED archives, which contain notably records of the WTO's Political Consultative Commission. It was at a meeting of this body in July that Gorbachev intimated that he had abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine. Its demise was however not made public, so that eastern European civic leaders had reason to fear another Prague-style intervention to uphold the status quo. "No one imagined the Soviet leadership's self-imposed restraint would be put to the test so soon." (p. 334)

Perhaps Gorbachev's greatest success was in his impact on Western opinion. But the notion of a 'common European home' was too idealistic to win consent, and unilateral concessions, notably over nuclear disarmament, weakened the USSR without securing a corresponding *quid pro quo*, so that ultimately the West got the best of the bargain. Russia has yet to come to terms with this outcome. It was largely attributable to the fact that millions of men and women at grass-roots level acted much more effectively than they had done in 1848.

Of this great revolution Altrichter offers a definitive account: sober, sympathetic, and immensely detailed. He can scarcely be faulted on a point of fact. Yet his strength lies in narrative. One cries out for more analysis: of the various options available to policy-makers and of the ambivalence that characterized many popular movements. How important was outside pressure in inducing change? How genuine was the drive for, say, Abkhazian autonomy from Georgia (the latter thought it faked by Moscow). Why cite without comment an estimate of casualties in the Ukrainian famine of 1932–1934 that is twice as high as today's consensus figure, reached after thorough research? And above all why did Gorbachev persist in his reformist course when it was clear that things were going badly wrong?

The author might fairly respond that hindsight distorts posterity's judgements. What he has given us is a panorama of events as they were lived through at the time. For this we should be grateful, since memories of 1989 are already fading and we should not let ourselves fall prey to the myth-makers.

John Keep, Bern

Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and its Successor States. Edited by Michael Kemper, Raoul Motika and Stefan Reichmuth. London, New York: Routledge, 2009. IX, 366 S. = Central Asian Studies Series. ISBN: 978-0-415-36815-5.

„Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and its Successor States“ describes the dynamic history of complex relationships between the Soviet and post-Soviet state(s) and Islamic education institutions in Tatarstan, Ukraine, Daghestan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. As one of the authors writes, "western researchers usually portray the Soviet era as a time of endless anti-Muslim repressions; the real situation, however, was less clear-cut and not so gloomy" (p. 107). The articles explain the reasons for the early Soviet state's moderate attitude towards Islam, especially in comparison to the Orthodox Church. Three factors were chief among these: 1) The Soviet state did not have resources to suppress Islamic institutions of learning, nor was it able to offer alternative quality schooling. 2) Soviet officials did not understand and were not familiar enough with the functioning of the decentralized Islamic institutions to be able to eliminate them. 3) Finally, acceptance of Islam by the Soviet state was a political move because it symbolized liberation from the past Tsarist imperialist suppression of Russia's Muslims, and also sent an important liberation message to the oppressed Muslims of the colonial world. It is in this context of the 1920s that we see actual growth, rather than decrease, of Islamic educational institutions, i.e. *madrasas* and *maktabs*, virtually all over the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union. Moreover, at the early stage of Communism it was allowed to teach Islam at Soviet secular schools, which would have been unthinkable in regards to Christian education. But already in the late 1920s and mid-1930s, as the articles thoroughly describe, suppression of religious leaders as well as the closure of Muslim schools demonstrate the Soviet government's growing perception that Islam was more a threat than an anchor for the Bolshevik revolution. Still, as the article on Azerbaijan describes, many mullahs landed in Soviet secular schools once they were banned from mosques, which meant that they could still

spread the religious word at schools. Deportation and purges of Muslim leaders and closure of schools, however, did not eliminate Islamic schooling, but rather forced it into underground existence. Yet important change was brought by World War II: in order to win Muslims' support for the war, schooling and religious practice was again allowed. After WWII Islamic institutions underwent "Sovietization" and Muslim Directorates were organized in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The authors then describe a renewed suppression of Islamic institutions in the mid-1950s and early 1960s and a bureaucratization of the relationship between the state and the Islamic institutions in the republics. Most of the authors accept that the post-Soviet revival of Islam and religious learning was not a simple return to the past, as the revival has been particularly connected to national re-definition and identity building. They also report that contemporary governments have become more restrictive and cautious towards Islamization of their countries since the late 1990s in fear of radical, or 'untraditional', Islam. Just as Islamic education survived in illegal form by going underground in the past, the same goes on today, because as governments attempt to hold a monopoly on education and faith, they are confronted with 'unofficial' Islam. The authors on Kazakhstan bluntly state that neither the Islamic authorities nor the government "are currently in the position to control the Islamic sector" (p. 291).

This collection is unique because it provides largely *local* experts' understanding of the history of Islam and of the Islamic institutions of their countries, presented in English. The articles are rich in historical documentary and statistical data, provide microhistorical anecdotes. Muslim religious leaders and groups are identified and given agency through description of their activities. At the end of the book, the authors include lists of Islamic literature and Islamic educational institutions in the contemporary states.

Although one ought to treat with care the authors' personal relationship to Islam, the authors generally show a distanced critical analysis of the historical developments in their countries. The article on Daghestan, for example, describes the Muslim leaders' support of the So-

viet state, under whose rule they hoped to find more freedom than during the Tsarist regime. The article on Azerbaijan, which is the collection's highlight, explains Azerbaijan's exceptional situation within the Soviet Union due to the fact that the majority of the population practice Shi'i Islam and due to the country's short history of independence between 1918 and 1920. During this period the secular Azerbaijani state largely eliminated *shariat* courts and *waqf* property, which the Soviet state struggled to do in other parts of the Soviet Union until late 1920s. The piece on Kazakhstan describes a very interesting episode of a coup by Muslim leaders against the Soviet-appointed *mufti* of the Kazakh SSR shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union. By describing resistance of Kazakh and non-Kazakh Muslim leaders against the authoritarian and ethno-nationalist *mufti*, who then forced his opponents to leave the official Islamic organization, the article explains broader political developments in late Soviet Kazakhstan and its legacy in post-Soviet period. The chapter on Uzbekistan is important because the population of Uzbekistan was regarded by Soviet leaders as the most religious and, consequently, the one that perceived to pose the most difficulty for secularization. This is why, for example, after WWII, the only officially accepted *madrasas* were founded in Tashkent and Bukhara. The authors describe how during the Soviet times the 'official' Islamic trend turned in a conservative direction, condemning other (especially Sufi) Muslim traditions. Thus, the authors argue, 'official' Islam "nearly conformed to the anti-religious propaganda of [Soviet] state and party" (p. 224).

Although most of the articles follow a common structure, often resembling country reports, there is little of cross-country comparison and explanation of differences. The articles repeat similar historical background data on the status of Islam and Islamic education. A common introductory chapter of Soviet policies towards Islam and Islamic education institutions in respective countries would have benefited the collection. A common, internationally accepted citation system of Soviet archival material would make it easier to follow up on the archival material. Moreover, a common transliteration of religious terms should have been made, e.g.

in some articles Islamic cultural endowments are spelled *waqf*, yet in another *vaqf*. More importantly, however, most authors neglect to explain the contemporary image and role of Islamic education institutions among the population. Many students, for example, in Central Asia enter *madrasas* only after they have failed to be accepted to secular universities.

These shortcomings, however, should not undermine the importance of the outstanding collection. The chapters not only provide experts' analysis of the rich historical data but also open new research questions, such as the role of Turkish lyceums and universities and their relation to Islamic education, connections between Muslim communities in respective countries in the Soviet Union, especially through the Soviet Uzbekistani *madrasas*, and outside of the Soviet Union, etc. The book will be interesting for experts and students of Islam, educators, and historians and other social scientists who are interested in the history of Islamic institutions under Communism and in the post-Soviet period.

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ELENA JU. ZUBKOVA: *Pribaltika i Kreml'. 1940–1953* [Das Baltikum und der Kreml'. 1940–1953]. Moskva: Rosspën, 2008. 351 S., Tab. = *Istorija stalinizma*. ISBN: 978-5-8243-0909-6.

Die hier anzuzeigende Monographie ist eine in mehrererlei Hinsicht erfreuliche Publikation: Zum einen kann sie von einem nicht-spezialisierten Leser mit Spannung gelesen werden, zum anderen schließt sie eine Forschungslücke zu Stalins Politik in der „baltischen Frage“ in den Jahren 1939 bis 1953. Jemand, der des emotionalisierenden und politisierenden Untertones sowie der Schwarz-Weiß-Dichotomie in den meisten aktuellen Publikationen zum selben Thema müde ist, erfreut sich insbesondere an Zubkovas gründlicher, quellengestützter Studie, die den Grundstein für die Historisierung der baltisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert legen kann. Denn seit Mitte der neunziger Jahre stehen Russland und die baltischen Staaten mit ihren geschichtspolitisch vermittelten Vergangenheitsbildern in einem sich scheinbar immer weiter vertiefenden Dissens. Es sind

nicht nur die gegensätzlichen Akzente im öffentlichen Mainstream, auch die sich der Historikerzunft zugehörig zählenden Autoren scheinen aneinander vorbeizuschreiben: Betrachten die litauischen, lettischen und estnischen Historiker die Sowjetzeit aus dem Blickwinkel der Gewaltgeschichte, geht es den russischen Kollegen um die Aufklärung der Kollaboration der Einheimischen mit den Nationalsozialisten während des Zweiten Weltkrieges (siehe z.B. *Pribaltika pod znakom svastiki 1941–1945. Sbornik dokumentov*. Moskva 2009; MICHAÏL KRYSIN *Pribaltijskij fašizm. Istorija i sovremennost'*. Moskva 2007; JURIJ EMELJANOV *Pribaltika. Počemu oni ne ljubjat bronzovogo Soldata?* Moskva 2007). Mit vollem Recht kann Zubkovas Arbeit neben dem 2006 erschienenen, aus der Arbeit der russisch-litauischen Historikerkommission „SSSR i Litva v gody Vtoroj mirovoj vojny“ hervorgegangenen Sammelband (A. KASPARAVICIUS, Č. LAURINAVICIUS, N. LEBEDEVA [Hrsg.] *SSSR i Litva v gody Vtoroj Mirovoj Vojny. T. 1.: SSSR i Litovskaja respublika (mart 1939 – avgust 1940 gg.) Sbornik dokumentov*. Vilnius 2006) als erfreuliche Ausnahme bewertet werden.

Die Autorin, bekannt für ihre Forschungen zum späten Stalinismus und zur Tauwetter-Periode, setzte sich zum Ziel, die Geschichte des Entscheidungsfindungsprozesses, der schließlich zur Sowjetisierung des Baltikums führte, aus der Moskauer Perspektive zu schreiben (S. 10). Die Logik des stalinschen Apparats in Bezug auf die baltische Region nimmt sie anhand vielfältiger Archivalien unter die Lupe: Als Quellenkorpus dienen hier zum einen Parteidokumente (Bestände des Politbüros, des Orgbüros, des Sekretariats des ZK VKP(b) – KPdSU), zum anderen die Dokumente der sowjetischen Exekutive (Bestände des Rates der Volkskommissare, des NKVD-MVD und des Finanzministeriums). Während einige der verwendeten Quellen bereits im 1990 in Moskau erschienenen Quellenband „Polpredy soobščajut ... Sbornik dokumentov ob otnošenijach SSSR s Latviej, Litvoj i Ėstoniej. Avgust 1939 – avgust 1940“ veröffentlicht wurden, macht die Verfasserin die meisten Politbüro-Dokumente zum ersten Mal der wissenschaftlichen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Durch ebendiese Dokumente gelingt der Autorin eine aufschlussreiche Re-