BOOK REVIEWS

BERNHARD JUSSEN, *Das Geschenk des Orest: Eine Geschichte des nachrömischen Europa 526–1535* (C.H. Beck: Munich, 2023), 480 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 78200 8. €44.00

The 'Middle Ages' is a concept deeply embedded in both the academic and the public understanding of the past in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the world. It organizes how people think about the past, and thus affects their perception of it, whether they realize it or not. It is, of course, not a concept that was used in the sources from this period—nobody ever thought they were living in the Middle Ages—and in this exciting new book, the Frankfurt historian Bernhard Jussen makes the case that it is high time to abolish it. 'This book is a provocation', proclaims the dustjacket, and so it proves to be.

Perhaps the most visible innovation of the book concerns the sources that it highlights. Throughout, Jussen centres not the written sources that most historical work tends to privilege, but visual imagery, using a 'media studies' (*Mediologie*) methodology. Each chapter is based around a key image or set of images which Jussen regards as especially telling and treats as a historical sign or *Geschichtszeichen*. These images are used neither to illustrate nor to confirm a written text, but as focal points in their own right, as keys to contemporary perception. By breaking away from the 'canonical' written sources in this way, Jussen aims to open up fresh perspectives.

The first two chapters work as a pair. They are focused on the commemorative image of a sixth-century widow named Turtura (or 'Turtle Dove'), praised for her fidelity to her dead husband; and on the thoroughly traditional ivory diptych of Turtura's contemporary, the Roman consul Orestes, from which the book takes its name. Jussen's argument is that the tension between these two representations shows the true transformation of the Roman world. This transformation had very little to do with migrants, invasions, or 'barbarians'. Rather, the

key was the change in the sacral system (*Sakralsystem*), as Christianity gradually supplanted and overturned established Roman traditions, and this was a change that the Romans brought about themselves.

At the heart of this shift was the revolution it brought about in kinship structures. Jussen proposes that ancient Roman society had been dominated by male ancestry, expressed legally through the role of the paterfamilias, and materially through wax casts of dead grandparents' faces and family lineages painted on walls (though very little of this material culture has survived). The form of Christianity that took over in Rome regarded this ancestor veneration with outright hostility. Instead of claims of ancestry and descent, it put the married couple at the heart of society, promoted spiritual kinship in the place of bonds of flesh and blood, and entrusted commemoration to specialists housed in institutions, rather than to the family at the graveside. Turtura's image was painted after her death, yet pointed to the future, whereas Orestes, with his mastery of an ancient symbolic code, was already living in the past.

The third chapter moves to ideas of kingship, and the imagery associated with it. Jussen points out how the misuse of this imagery has in the past led historians astray. A handful of idiosyncratic images of tenth- and eleventh-century Ottonian kings and emperors that depict them as Christ-like were long used by historians to underpin a reading of these rulers as 'sacral'. In reality, the Ottonians and their successors made far fewer claims to sacrality than their imperial peers in Constantinople, whose coins, from the sixth century, were minted with images of Christ and Mary. That was an iconography which Western rulers deliberately avoided. Conversely, the figure of the ruler on horseback, central to Roman imperial imagery, vanished from sculptural representation in both East and West, but Jussen points out that in the West it remained vibrant in other media, such as seals.

Chapter four is devoted to monasticism, viewed through the famous St Gall Plan devised by the monk Gozbert in the ninth century. Jussen highlights two features of this drawing of an idealized monastery: its inclusion of numerous altars, and the absence of an enclosing wall. The multiplication of altars shows how far Western European society was entangled in an economy of salvation that converted financial resources into spiritual welfare through clerical

ritual, while the lack of an enclosure demonstrates how monasteries were supposed to be thoroughly integrated into wider society. Jussen emphasizes that the *Rule of St Benedict* that was so influential in the West was what we might think of today as an inclusive and accessible form of monasticism, which eschewed the dramatic asceticism popular in other monastic practices. That, thinks Jussen, was linked to the way monasticism in the Latin West became mainstream.

The fifth chapter is inspired by a celebrated early fourteenth-century fresco in Siena's town hall, the Palazzo Pubblico. This fresco depicts personified virtues, including a representation of Concord or Unity holding a carpenter's plane to smooth over disagreement and dissent. From this image, Jussen develops a discussion of urban collective organization and self-representation as a form of participatory government and indeed civil society, which he sees as being in irreconcilable tension with traditional forms of top-down governance.

The book closes with another pair of chapters. Chapter six studies the popular motif of the mourning widow at her husband's graveside who encounters an attractive man. The tale was told, and represented, in various ways, including numerous woodcut prints from the fifteenth century on. But in all of them it reflected a challenge to the world-view of the faithful widow Turtura, for this widow was not quite so unequivocally loyal to her spouse. The final chapter looks at a painting by Hans Holbein the Younger in the early sixteenth century, *An Allegory of the Old and New Testaments*. Jussen reads this painting as a frontal attack on the conventions of figural representation promoted by the established Catholic Church, and thus as part of the reworking of the sacral system first established in the sixth century.

Given that the book's shape effectively reproduces a narrative of the Middle Ages—a millennium between ancient Rome and the Reformation, dominated by Catholic Christianity—what, then, is Jussen's objection to the concept? The answer lies in its connotations and associations. For instance, Jussen argues that the term skews discussion of artistic production at the court of the Carolingian kings. Conventional periodization insists that 'medieval' art was religious. That makes it harder to see that in fact these Carolingian debates freed artists from some of the burdens placed upon them by conventions of representing the sacred which remained embedded in Constantinople.

However, the central issue for Jussen is kinship and family structure. The association between the Middle Ages and family structures such as clans and lineages has, in his view, blocked the reception of anthropologically inspired research on kinship, to which research Jussen has himself made many distinguished contributions. This research presents more or less the opposite picture of the received wisdom about the Middle Ages: that this 'millennium of the turtle dove' (p. 61) was characterized by surprisingly weak kinship structures, with huge consequences both politically and culturally, since Jussen regards kinship as foundational to the social order more broadly.

In such a bold and wide-ranging book, there are of course points at which specialists may cavil. Jussen's focus on long-term kinship structures that were established in the sixth century and endured thereafter perhaps understates the subsequent changes in these structures prior to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The formal prohibition on priests' marriage in the eleventh century, for instance, was a quite radical step that finds little discussion here. Put differently, does it really make sense to talk of the Latin West in the twelfth century (and indeed later) as 'post-Roman'—in other words, as still meaningfully contained within a late Roman legacy?

Equally, one could argue that in other respects, the book is not long-term enough. For instance, one of the key features of kinship in the Latin West was monogamy, that is to say, the rule that both men and women can only be married to one person at a time. Many people today take this rule for granted, yet in reality it is far from a cultural universal, and in many parts of the world it is not the accepted framework for the social order. Marital monogamy was not, however, a product of the sixth century, or even of Christianity. It had deeper roots in pagan Roman culture, linked, perhaps, to Rome's distinctive private property regime. Its survival and indeed hardening in these post-Roman centuries shows that sixth-century Christianity did not, after all, change everything about kinship in Western Europe.

This book, then, certainly provokes counter-arguments. Yet it is not only a very stimulating read, but its central observation merits serious reflection. The notion of the Middle Ages takes its meaning from a world-view that supposed that modern society had much

more in common with antiquity than with the time of political chaos and religious intolerance 'in between'. Variants of this argument are still alive and kicking. But Jussen's insight is that today's pluralist civil society—the vantage point from which he suggests historians in the Western world now survey the past, after the end of the Cold War—actually has less in common with ancient authoritarian empires than with the collaborative and associational networks that replaced them, and whose origin and development this book is devoted to exploring and explaining.

As Jussen suggests, these are resonances and associations that the concept of the Middle Ages obscures, and was indeed designed to obscure. It might be argued that historians of the Middle Ages have signed a Faustian pact that on the one hand gives their research a recognized and, to some limited extent, protected place within the discipline, but at the price of explicitly coding it as not actually relevant for their colleagues, or for that matter everyone else. We do not share the *Weltsicht* (world-view) of the generations around 1800, so is it not time that historians started seriously thinking about approaches to the distant past that better suit our contemporary conjuncture, just as Bernhard Jussen does here?

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ISABELLA CHWALKA, *Kein Interesse? Fremd- und Selbstwahrnehmung in der deutschen und englischen Historiographie des 12. Jahrhunderts*, Orbis mediaevalis, 19 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2022), 446 pp. ISBN 978 3 847 11349 2. €65.00

This rich study of twelfth-century historical writing in England and Germany sets out with a very particular goal in mind: to find the image of the Other through which English and German authors conceptualized and judged one another. That no such stereotypes—more redolent of more recent periods of Anglo-German enmity—in fact emerge should not distract from the wealth of evidence and analysis accumulated in this book.

The book opens with Walter Map's twelfth-century comparison of the material foundations of royal power in the Latin West: English kings were rich, the French lacked everything except 'bread, wine, and joy!', while the German king had given everything away to the church except his military strength (p. 1). The remarkable anecdote is alas, for Chwalka, a red herring, 'at once the best and worst example' (p. 14) of evidence one could accumulate to assess perceptions of the Other. Eschewing such caricatured outliers, she seeks instead to 'compile as many testimonies as possible, especially the unspectacular ones' (p. 14). She draws upon a remarkable corpus of chronicles (sixty-four in total). The first section of the book (pp. 39–152) lists all mentions of England and Germany by authors writing in the opposing realm. Strict chronological limits attempt to standardize the material: only events from 1111–97 are included for the Holy Roman Empire and from 1100–99 for England (though these restrictions are occasionally relaxed). The second section (pp. 153–389), the richest part of the book, drills down into several case studies, selected because they proved to be the most frequently mentioned events in the statistical analysis. The conflict between Pope Alexander III and Frederick Barbarossa, and the imprisonment of Richard the Lionheart, are examined in the chronicles of both realms. The marriage alliances of Emperor Henry V and Henry the Lion, and Thomas Becket's martyrdom, form a further case study for the German authors; the Investiture Contest, especially Henry V's expedition to Rome in 1111, serves the same purpose for their English counterparts.

The book is interspersed with rich summaries of the pertinent scholarship regarding the events and chronicles examined (no mean feat given the sheer volume of the latter). There are intriguing historiographical asides. The classic volumes on medieval historical writing in each realm reflect different scholarly priorities: Wilhelm Wattenbach and Franz-Josef Schmale offer a survey divided by region (p. 39), Antonia Gransden by the reign of kings (pp. 86–90), a distant echo of the similarly regnal-focused approach of her English sources (though one should add that Gransden offered further subdivisions by genre and authorship). The summary of the German-language scholarship concerning twelfth-century English–German relations is particularly useful (pp. 27–31), highlighting how previous interpretations have been indebted to modern notions of international politics. English historians—in contrast to their medieval forebears—have paid far less attention to these relations than their German peers. Karl Leyser, Benjamin Arnold, and Joseph P. Huffmann are highlighted as the obvious exceptions, but their work could have been given more weight, and Timothy Reuter is strangely absent from this section. In an intriguing observation elsewhere, Chwalka does point out that Reuter and Björn Weiler appear to use different terminology for the empire depending on whether they are writing in English or German (p. 26, n. 58). The force of this potentially significant observation is undercut by the fact that only a minority of their publications have been consulted, a lapse with consequences to which I shall return.

The discussion of English and German identity is less convincing. The manifold difficulties entailed in disentangling the layers of regional, national, and imperial identity in twelfth-century Germany are correctly pointed out. But the discussion is surprisingly short (pp. 21–2) and the omission of work by Len Scales and Reuter is regrettable, not least because their arguments would have added nuance to Chwalka's claim that notions of English national identity were 'no less complicated and controversial' (p. 22).[1] The date of inception for English national identity has certainly been much debated, and the lands ruled by the English crown did fluctuate. But to suggest that, as

[1] Len Scales, *The Shaping of German Identity: Authority and Crisis, 1245–1414* (Cambridge, 2012) and essays by Reuter cited below.

a result, a 'unified *gens* did not exist for England' (p. 24) goes too far. The attempt to balance out the two scholarly debates—'while for the German Empire it is a question of the relationship between imperial and/or national consciousness . . . for the people of England the question of Norman or English identity is in the foreground' (p. 23)—is not convincing. The lack of reference to any of the essays collected in Timothy Reuter's magisterial *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities* is surprising and unfortunate.[2] In one particularly important contribution, Reuter argued that the unification of the English kingdom pre-1066 had produced a *Wirgefühl* (a feeling of unity in law, custom, and language). This was largely absent in Germany, where various *gentes* were bound together more by their link to a common ruler than by connections with one another.[3] Such unity has consequences for how one considers Chwalka's sources.

This corpus consists of, as she well recognizes, a heady mix of annals, monastic chronicles, royal biographies, and both national and universal histories. The inclusion of Orderic Vitalis and Robert of Torigni, but not Gislebert of Mons (or, indeed, Godfrey of Viterbo) requires more justification. John of Salisbury's *Historia Pontificalis* is another striking omission: an author familiar with the English royal court who had much to say on the empire (as Reuter's highly pertinent essay on this subject—not cited—attests).[4] At a more fundamental level, there are differences in the weighting of historiographical genres in the two realms which surely influenced the results of Chwalka's statistical analysis and which would have been better addressed directly (reading relevant essays by Weiler, Reuter, and Nicholas Vincent would have helped).[5] More attention should have been paid to the link

[2] Timothy Reuter, *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities*, ed. Janet Nelson (Cambridge, 2006).

[3] Timothy Reuter, 'The Making of England and Germany, 850–1050: Points of Comparison and Difference', in Reuter, *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities*, 284–99, at 298.

[4] Timothy Reuter, 'John of Salisbury and the Germans', in Michael Wilks (ed.), *The World of John of Salisbury* (Oxford, 1984), 415–25.

[5] See various comparisons made in Björn Weiler, 'The King as Judge: Henry II and Frederick Barbarossa as Seen by their Contemporaries', in Patricia Skinner (ed.), *Challenging the Boundaries of Medieval History: The Legacy of Timothy Reuter* (Turnhout, 2009), 115–40, at 135–40; Björn Weiler, 'How Unusual

Reuter highlighted between the remarkable English unity mentioned above and the fact that English writers, no doubt influenced by Bede and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, were more inclined than their German counterparts to view the past through the prism of the royal court. References to Henry Bainton's comparison of such texts to a '[n]ativity story for the nation' and Robert Swanson's identification of kingship as the historiographical focus in England (as opposed to bishops in Germany and cities in Italy) hint in this direction (pp. 88–9).

In contrast to their modern successors, the statistics show a greater interest among twelfth-century English historians in the empire than vice versa. The conclusion holds true at the extremes and in the round. All the English chronicles bar one (the *Gesta Stephani*) included at least one reference, whereas a third of the German sources did not mention England. Eight German authors mentioned England just once, and only two German writers included more than ten references (the figure is twelve for England). The range, among English historians, is enormous: a single remark in the *Annales Plymptonienses* and Richard of Hexham's *De gestis regis Stephani* compares to a staggering eighty-nine in Roger of Howden's *Chronica*. Chwalka is commendably forthright about the methodological pitfalls which lie behind the raw statistics.[6] A single reference in her survey could equate to a fleeting mention of the emperor in a sentence's subclause or a thematic, detailed, and reflective set piece. In the example she provides, Orderic Vitalis chronicled a sequence of events spanning twenty-seven years, linked together in the person of Henry V. Because the account is not interrupted by references to other topics, the five pages of discussion

was Matthew Paris? The Writing of Universal History in Angevin England', in Michele Campopiano and Henry Bainton (eds.), *Universal Chronicles in the High Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, 2017), 199–222; Nicholas Vincent, 'The Strange Case of the Missing Biographies: The Lives of the Plantagenet Kings of England 1154–1272', in David Bates, Julia Crick, and Sarah Hamilton (eds.), *Writing Medieval Biography, 750–1250* (Woodbridge, 2006), 237–58.

[6] For another attempt to apply a statistical approach to twelfth-century historical writing which presents comparable methodological problems, see Grischa Vercamer, *Hochmittelalterliche Herrschaftspraxis im Spiegel der Geschichtsschreibung: Vorstellungen von 'guter' und 'schlechter' Herrschaft in England, Polen und dem Reich im 12./13. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 2020); see also my review of this title in *GHIL Bulletin*, 44/1 (2022), 80–7.

(in the modern edition) count as a single 'unit of meaning' (p. 142). A greater number of mentions thus often reflects an author's narrative style, rather than necessarily their interest in the topic. William of Malmesbury's *Gesta regum Anglorum* provides only two references, for example, but they prove to be among the most interesting.

How might one explain the greater interest displayed by English authors if we take the statistics at face value? While Chwalka is correct to point to more intense bonds forged between England and the Continent by the Norman Conquest and the Papacy, other hints offered in her conclusion take us back to the more intriguing differences between the historiographical cultures of the two realms. English authors often prove to be better known and their background and sources easier to trace, their duties at court granting them access to oral and written material included in the composition of what were often lengthier histories. Again, the contrast is not simple or absolute: visits to the royal court, and journeys to Italy, are recorded for Ekkehard of Aura, Burchard of Ursberg, Otto of Freising, Rahewin, and Arnold of Lübeck. A subtler suggestion offered is that we can detect a greater 'or at least more verifiable mobility' (p. 152) among English writers. Rachel Koopmans has indeed drawn attention to how many of the authors in Chwalka's English corpus swapped information and inspiration in what was often a remarkably tight-knit social circle, one surely bound together more closely than in the far larger, more disparate regions of the German kingdom.[7]

Chwalka's analysis bears much richer fruit once we proceed to her case studies, where the thorough exploration of the historical background, the chronicles, and their sources pays dividends. The account of English reactions to the Investiture Contest and to the Salian emperors is fascinating. Henry V's campaign to Rome in 1111 and his scandalous imprisonment of Pope Paschal II received far greater attention than events at Canossa. William of Malmesbury offers a remarkable description of the latter: Henry IV is refused an audience by a pope disgusted by the emperor's depraved debauchery with his sister. Malmesbury himself had more time for him: here

[7] Rachel Koopmans, *Wonderful to Relate: Miracle Stories and Miracle Collecting in High Medieval England* (Philadelphia, 2011).

was a powerful, intelligent, well-read, and charitable ruler, comparable to the ancient Caesars, who had fought in sixty-two battles and nearly always triumphed against his enemies. On the endless *investiturae controversia* (Investiture Contest)—compared by Malmesbury to a hydra—the example of Orderic Vitalis in turn offers an abrupt reminder of the gap between the priorities of modern scholarship and those of our sources. For Orderic, like Malmesbury, incest triumphed over investiture. Investiture appears only once in a list of Henry IV's manifold offences, and the crime is not mentioned at all in relation to Henry V. Rudolf Schieffer was astonished that Orderic had appeared to mix up Henry IV and Philip I of France (the latter excommunicated for adultery).[8] As Chwalka shows, Orderic knew his target: lewd details of Salian licentiousness had travelled beyond the seemingly limited circulation of polemical texts within the empire and reached as far afield as St Evroul and Malmesbury.

The discussion of Richard the Lionheart's captivity by English and German authors is equally impressive, adding nuance to previous conclusions reached by Knut Görich and John Gillingham. Görich suggested that the capture of the English crusader king by Leopold V, duke of Austria, had been justified by German authors with reference to Richard's dishonourable conduct at Acre when tearing down the duke's banner. In fact, only two sources mention this. Other chroniclers wrote of insulting behaviour by the king towards Leopold, the German contingent as a whole, and God, or they condemned his actions elsewhere. Rare references are made by the chroniclers here to broader national categories. Otto of St Blasien suggested that the German and Italian knights left Acre, decrying *Anglicam perfidiam* (English perfidy); the *Chronica regia Coloniensis* claimed Richard questioned the bravery of the Germans as a people; the Marbach Annals named him an enemy of the empire. An impatient reader might think we have finally stumbled upon the much looked-for construction of the Other. Ludwig Schmugge and Günther Blaicher guide us in this direction, arguing that the experience of crusading led to the formation of more precise and vicious national caricatures (see pp. 236–7).

[8] Rudolf Schieffer, 'Worms, Rom und Canossa (1076/77) in zeitgenössischer Wahrnehmung', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 292 (2011), 593–612, at 609.

Have we found, with such remarks, the beginnings of a stereotype that would, far in the future, be wielded by the likes of Napoleon to cut perfidious Albion down to size? Not quite. Accusations of infidelity, Chwalka cautions, were applied to numerous targets. The febrile conditions of the crusader camps before Acre had not, in fact, incubated the seeds of later English–German enmity.

Where German authors passed over Richard's actual imprisonment with a discreet silence, their English contemporaries felt duty-bound to defend their king's conduct. Yes, Richard had insulted Leopold's honour, but quite right too! Richard may have cut down the duke's tent, but Leopold should not have placed it so close to the king's pavilion or refused Richard's request to move it a short distance. It was sheer folly for him to demand an equal share in the spoils; he was a duke, not a king. The justice of Richard's cause was all too apparent when Leopold died in 1194 following a tournament accident, a gruesome death reported with relish by English authors lapping up the gossip spread by hostages returning from Austria. According to William of Newburgh, they had milk and honey on their tongues when reporting the news. Henry VI received a variety of negative judgements: angry, envious, impressionable, and comparable to Pharaoh, and even Saladin, in his lack of Christian honour and imperial dignity. Negative generalizations feature again. Ralph of Diceto called the Austrians foul-smelling barbarians who spoke a horrible language and resembled wild beasts living in squalor. Such remarks were again atypical. The German princes campaigning for Richard's release received a positive press, as did Henry VI once he was thought to be planning a new crusade.

The care with which Chwalka has dissected these accounts will be readily apparent. An equally significant service rendered by her book is to shine a light on the rich exchange of information which underpinned these narratives, with chroniclers drawing upon an array of letters, chronicles, personal experience, and foreign contacts. The importance, for English authors, of the histories written by Marianus Scotus, Sigebert of Gembloux, Ekkehard of Aura, and David the Scot is clear (direct references by their German peers to English histories prove rarer). Eyewitness testimonies were also crucial: Eadmer described the encounter of Archbishop Ralph d'Escures with Henry V; Malmesbury

claimed to have heard stories about Gregory VII from a monk who had heard them from Abbot Hugh of Cluny (Henry IV's godfather and a witness to Canossa); the Cologne Chronicle described a delegation sent to Rouen to speak with Henry II of England in 1168; and Ralph of Coggeshall drew the details of Richard's imprisonment from the king's chaplain, Anselm. The evidence for such contact and exchange, even within the remit of Chwalka's analysis, is considerable. They surely represent 'the tip of the iceberg'.[9]

Yet Chwalka's assessment of these contacts is surprisingly downbeat. The theoretical discussion of 'communication' is an unwelcome detour from an otherwise useful set of observations (pp. 77–8). Particularly influential for Chwalka is Andreas Bihrer's concept of *mittlere Entfernung* ('middle distance', p. 16): an intermediate zone where the Other could be constructed in a more dynamic and varied manner. Conflict and contact between England and Germany are judged not to have been as intense or immediate as between England and France, nor as remote—in a somewhat dramatic leap—as between the Latin West and the Mongols or China (p. 16). This model takes us to her conclusions which—like the book's hesitant title—often strike a surprisingly negative tone, given the wealth of evidence and insights which precede them. On the one hand, significant omissions are rightly pointed out. No suggestion is found of the imperial overlordship so fiercely debated by twentieth-century historians, nor a 'centre of perception' (p. 145) or particularly obvious geographical patterns. The overall conclusions, however, are often too starkly formulated; as per Bihrer's model, 'constant contact—as well as constant awareness' (p. 242) did not exist. France is the necessary foil here: unlike England's 'immediate neighbour, the empire was not the constant focus of the scribes' (p. 385). Personal contacts between England and the empire 'had no measurable influence on the acquisition of information about the Other in German sources' (p. 85). Among German authors, a 'consistent interest' in developments in the English polity could not be proven (p. 241). Although 'a large amount of information on England and a variance of opinions could be found' (p. 242), the triggers to

[9] Quotation from Timothy Reuter, 'All Quiet Except on the Western Front? The Emergence of Pre-Modern Forms of Statehood in the Central Middle Ages', in Reuter, *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities*, 432–58, at 445.

discuss English events were external (the crisis of the papal schism or Richard's imprisonment). More negative stereotypes stemmed from 'emotionality due to insecurity' or were 'persuasive stylistic devices' (p. 243) for self-reassurance. Authors oscillated between 'indifference and tense attention' (p. 244). Fundamental notions of the Other, comparable to the prejudicial stereotypes formed in relation to Slavs or Muslims, cannot be found, nor a fixed image of foreign rulers: chroniclers did not have 'firmly established ideas about the Other . . . [nor] thought deeply about the differences between the two nations' (p. 397). Walter Map's humorous anecdote, it seems, was indeed atypical.

Yet if readers flip back to the initial statistical analysis, they will find an array of fascinating examples: stragglers, whose voices have been drowned out in the book's quick march towards the selected case studies. Important themes emerge from this more diverse set of material. Many English authors, for example, recognized the (growing) significance of the princes in the governance of the empire (that Ralph of Diceto explicitly discussed the office of imperial chancellor and its applicability to Thomas Becket is relegated to a footnote: p. 319, n. 1,345). The English portrayal of princely opposition to Henry VI, which sought to protect the *honor imperii* against his arbitrary tyranny, fits neatly into this pattern. References to the imperial episcopate would also have made for an intriguing case study. Orderic Vitalis' observation that the archbishop of Mainz travelled with 500 knights could have led to a broader discussion of one of the most potent German stereotypes in the period, that of the bloodthirsty militant Teutonic bishop (studies of which, by Reuter and Scales, were not consulted).[10] Comments by Walter Map and William of Malmesbury that German kings were weak because they had given too much away to the church will thrill any scholars still engaged in the *Reichskirchensystem* debates (Malmesbury claimed that they had done so specifically to escape the control of the lay nobility). It is really worth stressing here the sheer amount of material referred to by Chwalka,

[10] Len Scales, '*Germen Militiae*: War and German Identity in the Later Middle Ages', *Past and Present*, 180 (2003), 41–82; Timothy Reuter, '*Episcopi cum sua militia*: The Prelate as Warrior in the Early Staufer Era', in Timothy Reuter (ed.), *Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Karl Leyser* (London, 1992), 79–94.

but left untapped, ranging from discussions of Carolingian and Ottonian ancestry (for both English and German rulers) to attempts by German kings to introduce taxes based on English models. Ralph Niger—in his descriptions of the Magi at Cologne, campaigns in Italy, and the imperial episcopate—is indeed recognized as having shown a 'marked interest in German history' (p. 137). We miss out too on Walter Map's incredible suggestion that Henry V, having slain his brother and quarrelled with the princes, faked his own death and retired to a monastery. Map even cites an expletive—*Tpwrut Aleman*—'reckoned to this day by all Germans as the worst of insults . . . a reproach which constantly causes many quarrels between them and foreigners'.[11] The material fits Reuter's highly pertinent characterization of Walter Map's initial anecdote as 'seemingly unusable: imprecise, historically inaccurate, cliché ridden'—but nonetheless illustrative of the capacity of these authors to compare and contrast.[12]

To only judge the extent of contact and awareness between England and Germany by either the final case studies, or by reference to models of the Other, would be to miss out on far too much of the rich bounty that Chwalka has unearthed from her sources (before one even begins to think, beyond her remit, of what could be gleaned from other genres of sources or areas of economic, religious, intellectual, and artistic life). The absence of any reference throughout the book to Robert Bartlett's *Making of Europe*—in a study concerned with the Other in the Latin West—is inexplicable and perhaps also significant for the work's framing and ultimate conclusions.[13] As Bartlett argued, twelfth-century Europe bore witness to a high degree of integration and mobility of the kind Chwalka has observed between England and Germany. Hostile notions of the Other did exist, but were directed more often towards those beyond the edge of this increasingly homogenous core—by English authors looking north and west, and by their German counterparts towards the east. Chwalka's search for such an Other in two polities at the centre of this zone might always

[11] Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium: Courtiers' Trifles,* ed. and trans. M. R. James, C. N. L. Brooke, and R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1983), 458.
[12] Reuter, 'All Quiet Except on the Western Front?', 452.
[13] Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950–1350* (London, 1993).

have proved elusive. Yet, paradoxically, one should not take her conclusion—nor the book's title—at its word. What she has uncovered instead is more nuanced and arguably more interesting: a pair of vibrant historical cultures enriching one another through fleeting, but nonetheless significant exchanges of information, documents, and personal experiences, whose authors displayed a breadth of vision when writing about their European neighbours that compares favourably with that of their modern successors. *Kein Interesse* is not without its faults: the lack of reference to works by not only Bartlett and Reuter, but also Weiler, Scales, and Thomas Förster is regrettable and significant.[14] But it remains a valiant comparative study whose approach, interpretations, and conclusions reward close reading and prolonged reflection.

[14] In addition to the works cited above, particularly relevant are Timothy Reuter, 'The Medieval German *Sonderweg*? The Empire and its Rulers in the High Middle Ages', in Reuter, *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities*, 388–412; Timothy Reuter, 'Modern Mentalities and Medieval Polities', ibid. 3–18; Timothy Reuter, 'Past, Present and No Future in the Twelfth-Century *Regnum Teutonicum*', in Paul Magdalino (ed.), *The Perception of the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe*, (London, 1992), 15–36; and Thomas Förster, *Vergleich und Identität: Selbst- und Fremddeutung im Norden des hochmittelalterlichen Europa* (Berlin, 2009).

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FRANZISKA KLEIN, *Die Domus Conversorum und die Konvertiten des Königs: Fürsorge, Vorsorge und jüdische Konversion im mittelalterlichen England*, Europa im Mittelalter, 37 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), xii + 308 pp. ISBN 978 3 110 68714 9. £91.00

In any society in which religion is a differentiating factor, converting from one religion to another has particular significance. For a relatively long time after their conversion (and sometimes permanently), converts see themselves, or others see them, as belonging not only to one community but as embodying much of their old world—the one they have left behind. Their milieu, their religious and social practices, and of course suspicion towards them from the ranks of their new religion mean that converts often occupy a distinct place within society. In 1232, the English king Henry III established a dedicated institution on what was then the edge of the city (today Chancery Lane, at that time *Newestrete*) to accommodate, educate, and provide for Jews from all over the country who had converted to Christianity. It was called the Domus Conversorum—the 'first royal home for converts in the Latin Midde Ages' (p. 23). There is nothing left of the building itself; the former headquarters of the Public Record Office (now the King's College Maughan Library) were built on the site in the nineteenth century. It is just about possible, however, to reconstruct its history—albeit with gaps and discontinuities, and often only from later sources.

The history of the Domus Conversorum is the subject of this excellent book by Franziska Klein, which came out of the PhD thesis she completed at the University of Duisburg–Essen in 2017. Equipped with a highly reflective methodology, the author has structured her study clearly and justified her approach very well throughout. First, Klein explains her sources. Apart from a more detailed report by Matthew Paris on its founding, there are very few thirteenth-century records pertaining to this establishment. An almost uninterrupted sequence of bills, admissions orders, and receipts from the house itself, however, has survived. These date from 1331, and offer insight into the institution's occupancy, staffing, and financial situation. This

Translated by Marielle Sutherland (GHIL).

sequence comes to an end in 1609 (p. 25), but it is interesting to note that the Domus Conversorum survived the (by no means complete) expulsion of the Jews in 1290. A large number of its residents found their way to England from different European countries (including Spain, Portugal, the Ottoman Empire, France, and the Holy Roman Empire), although we know very little about their reasons for doing so (p. 229–30). In 1308, forty-one men and ten women were admitted to the institution. In terms of the gender ratio, the house was unequivocally male-dominated in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period (p. 230).

The first section examines the prevalence of, and resources involved in, welfare for converts in England in the thirteenth century, the aim of which was to prevent a decline in their social status (p. 29). This section begins with a detailed inventory of the Domus Conversorum, which is recognized not only as a central institution that cared for converts but also in its capacity as a foundation—in Michael Borgolte's sense of a 'total social phenomenon [*totales soziales Phänomen*]'[1]—and as a self-contained establishment for poor relief (p. 25). According to this inventory, the Domus by no means grew 'out of nothing' but followed a tradition on which it left its own mark (p. 27). Klein's understanding of welfare for converts is decidedly not one of 'individual action' but of social practice—endowed with a strong sense of social commitment.

The second section is entitled 'Alternatives to Royal Welfare'. Extending the perspective she has set out thus far, Klein turns to those converts who did not benefit to the same degree from royal welfare but pursued independent careers—for example, in royal service. Other alternatives to royal welfare were, Klein observes, marriage, the priesthood, or—strikingly, of course—crime (pp. 111–19). Section three is entitled 'Crossing and Drawing Boundaries: Challenges and Questions around English Policies on Jews and Conversion'. Klein profiles English welfare policy against the background of royal Jewish and conversion policies, raising questions about the status of Jews and converts in the Kingdom of England, and particularly their relationship to the Crown. Klein stresses that baptism was a 'conflict generator'

[1] Michael Borgolte, *Weltgeschichte als Stiftungsgeschichte: Von 3000 v.u.Z. bis 1500 u.Z.* (Darmstadt, 2017), 9.

(pp. 162, 166), a concept she illustrates in very different ways. As an example of a property dispute deriving from a conversion, she cites a case from the mid thirteenth century: an argument between Josce, who was a Jew from Canterbury, and his daughter. Josce was unenthusiastic about his daughter's conversion plans. When she and her husband announced they were going to convert, he promptly withdrew the dowry of 30 marks he had given her upon their marriage. He then received orders from the Crown to return the money, although it is unclear whether the converts were allowed to keep it or whether it was ultimately seized by the king. As well as such property disputes, Klein describes other obstructions to conversions, kidnappings, and cases of converts threatening Jews.

The fourth section explores planning, control, and the handling of contingencies, investigating the functions and effects of welfare for converts in England. Central to this was education in the Christian faith, which converts received at the Domus Conversorum (p. 211). The many measures Klein lists include general facilitation of work and careers, but above all support from the Crown for careers in the Church and for marriages (p. 212). Section five turns to the broader history of the Domus Conversorum after the expulsion of the Jews from England. Here, Klein establishes that despite its unquestionable significance, the year 1290 did not represent an immediate turning point in the existence of the Domus Conversorum. However, during this year—as documented by fewer payments from the Crown and numerous reports on catastrophic living conditions in the house—the institution found itself at a crisis point, and this lasted until the mid fourteenth century (p. 225). Crucial in the survival and gradual transformation of the institution was not least the fact that it became an important site of the royal chancery. Exactly when the Crown began storing chancery records (especially rolls) in the chapel of the Domus Conversorum can, according to Klein, no longer be established, but it had already been reported that Philip Gerardyn 'venit coram Cancellario . . . in capella domus conversorum London [came to the Chancellery . . . in the chapel of the Domus Conversorum in London]' (p. 234). For the years following, Klein continues, records of legal transactions are legion, and consequently, the chapel of the house acquired the title *capella rotulorum*, or Rolls Chapel. At the end

of the fifteenth century, it even replaced the Tower in its role as 'document repository' (p. 234). Whereas the converts thus featured less and less from the fourteenth century, becoming more an accessory to the house than the centre of its work, the Masters of the Rolls, and with them the royal chancery, increasingly shaped the character of the site (p. 236). Further architectural changes were made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before, in the nineteenth century, the famous Public Record Office building was erected, the home of the British National Archives until 1974.

At the end of her book, Klein rightly points out that despite all her emphasis on welfare, we must not forget that there were also converts who were neither recipients of aid nor employees of the Crown. Such people, whose existence is confirmed by isolated sources, still represent a blind spot in the study of English conversion policy, for they are mentioned in the sources only in exceptional cases. Further studies on converts in England, Klein argues, are needed to examine this group more closely, coming at it from a local angle instead of from her rather centralized, royal perspective. Our knowledge of converts at the parochial level is still rather hazy in terms of both their everyday integration into the majority society and their contact with Jews; a cursory glance at the Husting Rolls of Common Pleas reveals there is great potential for research in this area. More generally, there is in fact a considerable gap in research on the inclusion of converts in the Christian community beyond the Iberian Peninsula and the Kingdom of Naples, and the few short studies completed thus far have not been able to fill it. Research on converts primarily needs to use regional sources to focus on localizing this phenomenon of poor relief and Jewish policy.

Klein's book contains a wealth of valuable insights, not least the fascinating idea put forward in its conclusion: that it was no accident that the increased separation between Jews and Christians and the stepping up of welfare for converts came at around the same time, but rather that both phenomena had the same root cause. Both were a reaction to a proximity between Christians and Jews that the Christian society increasingly considered problematic. The most powerful stories of personal fates in the book—in my opinion—are those that are ambiguous: descriptions of the majority society's ineradicable

resentment towards newly converted Christians, such as in the case of Henry of Winchester, perhaps the most famous of all thirteenth-century English converts. King Henry III himself was involved in Winchester's conversion; he lifted him from the baptismal font and knighted him. Henry of Winchester played a crucial role in the buying and selling of Jewish bonds. In 1261, he was ordered by the king to store the bonds in six chests. Nonetheless, as Klein convincingly shows, his Jewish origins always went before him, like a stain on his character (p. 182). Following an objection by Thomas de Cantilupes (*c.*1220–82), the Bishop of Hereford, he was denied a decisive role in investigations into counterfeit coins. Thomas even threatened to resign from the counsel if this 'convert and Jew' were to be given such power over the lives of Christians (p. 182).

It is also worth drawing attention to the book's appendix; in it, there are transcriptions from the National Archives that document the distribution of converts in 1255; reprints of a letter from the convert Alicia of Worcester to Robert Burnell, the chancellor and bishop of Bath and Wells (*c.*1275–92); a report on the state of the Domus Conversorum and the number of residents in 1308; and a petition by the convert Andrew to Edward II (*c.*1315). An index of names, places, and institutions rounds off the study, which, in its interplay between specific individual cases and general inferences, is key to our understanding of how the English monarchy dealt with England's Jews, even beyond the history of the Domus Conversorum. The book is one of the most important new publications on Christian converts in the Middle Ages since Jean-Claude Schmitt's *The Conversion of Herman the Jew*.[2]

[2] Jean-Claude Schmitt, *The Conversion of Herman the Jew: Autobiography, History, and Fiction in the Twelfth Century*, trans. Alex J. Novikoff (Philadelphia, 2010; French original 2003).

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DAVID BLACKBOURN, *Germany in the World: A Global History, 1500–2000* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2024), xxv + 774 pp. ISBN 978 1 631 49183 2. £40.00

Making sense of German history has remained a challenge far into the twenty-first century, and is certainly not confined to parochial undertakings at German universities, but has become somewhat of a global enterprise in itself. Several decades ago, master historians of the post-war West German generation such as Thomas Nipperdey, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, and Heinrich August Winkler launched their multi-volume works on modern Germany, roughly since the late eighteenth century, and in many respects, those books have remained the gold standard in the field.[1] They share a combination of energetic writing, erudite knowledge of specialized research, and a guiding interpretation that, despite some differences between the three, may be broadly characterized as a modified reckoning with the German *Sonderweg*. Back then, when Nipperdey and Wehler were still conceiving and writing their first volumes, two young British historians self-confidently stepped up and challenged prevalent notions that Germany had diverged from a liberal–democratic trajectory of modernity in the nineteenth century with the 'failure' of the 1848 revolution, Bismarck's authoritarian empire, and the ensuing Wilhelmine deformations that fed into the Third Reich. These are but 'Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung', David Blackbourn und Geoff Eley lamented—historiographical myths about alleged 'peculiarities of German history', as their enormously influential treatise was titled in the expanded English edition of 1984.[2]

Fast-forward four decades, and both Blackbourn and Eley have long since moved to the United States and risen to the ranks of highest

[1] Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1918*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1983–92), vol. i published in English as *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, trans. Daniel Nolan (Princeton, 1996); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 1700–1990*, 5 vols. (Munich, 1987–2008); Heinrich August Winkler, *Germany: The Long Road West*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2006–7). See also: James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770–1866* (Oxford, 1989).

[2] David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte Revolution von 1848* (Berlin, 1980); David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford, 1984).

eminence in the field of German and European history, although their academic ways have parted. While Eley has emerged as a rare flag-bearer of Marxist historiography, David Blackbourn has moved to the centre (or always stood there) and continued his challenging of established perspectives through much more sophisticated intellectual approaches, often taking up views from the margins: Württemberg rather than Prussia in his PhD on the Centre Party; ordinary Roman Catholic folk in a small town rather than the state bureaucracy otherwise hailed as modern and liberal in his study of apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Marpingen; and the transformation of German waterways in what still stands as a pioneering book on the history of landscapes in his *Conquest of Nature*.[3] With his most recent publication, *Germany in the World*, Blackbourn continues his quest to make sense of German history somewhat against the grain, albeit in a different way: not just with the synthetic scope of a book that presents an *histoire totale* of Central Europe across five centuries (a bold claim made quite explicitly in the introduction),[4] but by taking up a conceptual challenge that has now arrived in the mainstream of historiography and has been widely discussed for more than two decades—namely, global history and its impact on Germany, a nation long considered a mere continental player aside from the few decades of formal colonial rule between 1884 and 1918.

With this intellectual effort, Blackbourn addresses two admonitions to the profession, particularly in Germany, that he has consistently been making for a long time: the 'lack of sense of space' in much conventional writing (certainly in Nipperdey and Wehler), and the shrinking of the time span of German history—in particular, the neglect of the nineteenth century (unimaginable in the good old times of the *Sonderweg*!) in favour of the twentieth, or what German historians often call *Zeitgeschichte*. While the publisher's claim on the dust

[3] Cf. David Blackbourn, *Class, Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in Württemberg before 1914* (New Haven, 1980); David Blackbourn, *Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Bismarckian Germany* (Oxford, 1993); David Blackbourn, *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany* (New York, 2006).

[4] 'I have cast my net wide. Politics, war and peace, economics, culture, gender, education, science, the environment, race, religion—all have a place' (p. xxv).

cover that the history of Germany 'has often been told as if it began in 1871' is grossly overblown, taking the Reformation as a starting point is a remarkable endeavour, also vis-à-vis the aforementioned grand viziers' storytelling, which started only with the decomposition of the Holy Roman Empire or even, in Nipperdey's famous first sentence, with Napoleon. Perhaps it represents a trend born in Nashville, Tennessee, as Blackbourn's colleague at Vanderbilt, Helmut Walser Smith, opted for a similarly wide chronology in his own account, which centred on the nation rather than the global.[5] Still, only about one third of the roughly 650 pages of text is devoted to the three 'early modern' centuries, including some material in part II that covers the transformative period 1780–1820. The story becomes more expansive towards the present, with the nineteenth century unfolding over 160 pages and, finally, the twentieth century (from 1914) over 280.

The meaning of global in this book is wide rather than narrow, reaching far beyond specific schools or approaches, and its author is certainly not in the post-colonial camp. He includes Germany's European interconnectedness, with a lot of attention paid to the classic theme of German–French exchanges and entanglements. Indeed, the notions of transnational and entangled history seem to describe this approach best, its truly global reach notwithstanding. Driven by genuine intellectual curiosity and an astounding ability to digest tons of specialized literature, Blackbourn tells fascinating stories about Germans out there in the world, beyond the borders of the German lands in Central Europe. He explores the influences not just of German military power and violence abroad, but the enormous soft power of German culture, be it in ideas and institutions of education (the university, yes, but also the kindergarten!) or in realms of 'high culture' such as classical music or 'world literature', the claim to which may be traced back to Goethe. Indeed, Germans themselves would blush in the light of so much praise being heaped on their country, especially in the chapters on the long nineteenth century, from Weimar classicism to the cultural and scientific advancements of the *Kaiserreich*. The book is also about the other direction—about 'the world in Germany',

[5] Helmut Walser Smith, *Germany: A Nation in Its Time. Before, During, and After Nationalism, 1500–2000* (New York, 2020).

to invert its title—with regard to Germany taking in French or American influences, or other nationals, as in the waves of migration that have increasingly shaped the country since the late 1950s.

Yet what does David Blackbourn tell us, and how does he do it? The book starts out as an impressive panorama of vignette biographies of Germans who ventured abroad in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Readers will encounter sailors, merchants, and soldiers, often commissioned by non-German enterprises or armed forces, as individuals or in larger constellations, forming German-speaking colonies in Portugal, Latin America, and just about anywhere in the populated world and on its margins. Indeed, the first third of the book, roughly, is a testament to a major trend in German history (and beyond) over the last two or three decades: the attention to the lives of individuals and their experiences of the world. This focus on subjectivities has transformed early modern history (for example, with its attention to egodocuments), as well as our understanding of the twentieth century with the massive impact of *Zeitzeugen* (witnesses of the past), especially in the history of the Holocaust and its aftermath. Beyond its interest in the global, Blackbourn's account may be seen as a major attempt to bring this microhistorical approach to fruition in a larger synthesis. The result is compelling and captivating, and yet offers clear proof of what this kind of narrative cannot achieve. There is little effort to account for institutions such as the Holy Roman Empire, or the estates of late feudal society, and a near absence of structural explanations. Sometimes Blackbourn appears to turn in this direction, only to come up with yet another biographical story in the next sentence.

The fabric of the book changes significantly, however, as the story progresses into the nineteenth century. Individual actors retreat, a different kind of storytelling is woven into the larger narrative, and the author increasingly includes a more systematic kind of consideration. By the time we reach the twentieth century, this mode of writing has become all but dominant. In the chapters on the Third Reich and the Holocaust, readers will encounter the type of research-based factor analysis they may be familiar with from Nipperdey or Wehler. The Holocaust chapter starts with a brief reference to Victor Klemperer's diaries, but quickly shifts to four main characteristics, or 'four things

on which most historians agree' (p. 498) in systematically assessing the Shoah. Readers now are provided with the orientation in the research landscape that was absent from the early modern chapters, while individual voices, or exemplary stories of lives of ordinary people, rarely come up, including Jewish lives in the years of persecution and mass murder. Overall, the narrative of the book in its second half turns more towards the well-established, both in the way the story is crafted as well as in its content and subject matter. Compared to Michael Wildt's recent history of Weimar and Nazi Germany, with its 'postmodern' view from the margins of the empire and through the eyes of marginalized people,[6] Blackbourn's twentieth-century account is much more 'centred', mainstream, and sometimes even conventional.

In a still different sense, what kind of German history is it that David Blackbourn maps out in this impressive tour de force? True to his beginnings as an anti-*Sonderweg* historian, he does not see Germany as having taken a different course from other European nations over the many centuries. The myriad global Germans in the early modern era and into the nineteenth century are testimony to an entangled nation, much as the British and Portuguese are well known to have been. Then again, it is more complicated, as we are often reminded that Germans abroad mostly stood in service of other countries, and therefore the notion of Germany as a latecomer to global aspirations, and colonial ones in particular, is not off the table. When did it all start to go wrong, if not with German isolation, or the failed revolution in 1848? Blackbourn goes along with current mainstream research in pointing to some radicalization in the late Wilhelmine period (albeit with less emphasis on radicalized, and racialized, science), and otherwise looks to the First World War and the ensuing peace settlement. With regard to colonialism, the litmus test is the connection between colonial violence, especially in the genocidal campaigns against the Herero and Nama in Southwest Africa (1904–7), and the Holocaust. Blackbourn remains cautious, and sometimes vague, when he attributes 'colonial levels of violence' to the conduct of the Wehrmacht (p. 490), and turns a question of causation into an issue of memory when he finds that violence in

[6] Michael Wildt, *Zerborstene Zeit: Deutsche Geschichte 1918–1945* (Munich, 2022).

Eastern Europe during the Second World War 'recalls what had been done to Nama and Herero' (p. 482).

The final chapter on post-1949 Germany, divided and reunited, even comes with a classic redemptive storyline, reminiscent of Heinrich August Winkler's *Long Road West*, as its title reads 'The German Question Answered'. The issue of reconciling liberal democracy with a nation-state may well have been answered for good. But so many other German questions remain open, and not least questions about Germany in the world, and the world coming to Germany. Will the German empire of global industrial and trade domination soon collapse? Will ethnic Germans and immigrants alike finally manage to strike a balance between acknowledging diversity and constructing collective identities and communal spirits that go beyond ethnic origin? In the meantime, David Blackbourn's global history of Germany is indispensable reading for anyone seriously interested in the history of that country—a history that in post-*Sonderweg* times still holds a firm place in general discourses on the trajectories and predicaments of modernity.

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JONATHAN PARRY, *Promised Lands: The British and the Ottoman Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), xvii + 480 pp. ISBN 978 0 691 18189 9. £40.00

The entanglement of empires and the mentalities of those involved in such exchanges have been the focus of many studies in recent years.[1] Seen through this lens, regions of multicultural engagement, such as the Ottoman Empire, have become major research areas. These studies test and refine concepts like geopolitics, international law, and Orientalism and demonstrate their impact on the local and transnational context.[2]

Jonathan Parry's book *Promised Lands* is another exciting contribution that connects the mentality of British actors in the Middle East with British geopolitical engagement in the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the long nineteenth century. The impact of British mentalities on broader European politics has been described and analysed recently;[3] Parry now offers a history of Britain's oriental politics from Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 to 1854, the first year of the Crimean War.

The author offers a multifaceted description of individual actions in the Ottoman territories and explores the global impact of different perceptions of these areas. The title of the book, *Promised Lands*, is a biblical reference. The plural form emphasizes the diversity of the region, which is often oversimplified as the Middle East (p. 3). But the title carries a second connotation. Most of the actors, despite dire conditions, were motivated by their hope of improving the regions through their personal efforts and by exporting the boons of (Western) civilization (pp. 380–1). They believed they were destined to recreate the Promised Land.

Adopting a history of mentalities approach, Parry outlines the lives, career paths, and cultural endeavours of many actors linked

[1] E.g. Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, *Arguing about Empire: Imperial Rhetoric in Britain and France, 1882–1956* (Oxford, 2017).

[2] E.g. Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, *Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800–1850* (Cambridge, MA, 2016).

[3] E.g. Andreas Rose, *Zwischen Empire und Kontinent: Britische Außenpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 2011).

to the Ottoman Empire. Most of the twelve chapters of the book are divided into subsections, each of which is narratively structured around one person who was active in a particular region and at a particular time. The author describes their biographical background, political activities, and thinking, embedding their actions in the broader picture of local and transnational politics. The use of publications and personal, business, and diplomatic papers written by actors in very different positions provides an interesting insight into the interconnections between political actions and distinguishes the study from many works that draw only upon diplomatic and military documents.

Parry weaves a mostly coherent story from the records of many different individuals, institutions, and companies within a complex context. He highlights not only political negotiations but also the crucial role of economic relations (for example, pp. 309–17), religious perceptions (for example, pp. 239–48), and the impact of archaeological findings on narratives in London as well as on individual careers (for example, pp. 290–7). Rarely has the entanglement of microhistory and political history been illustrated in such detail. Yet the author's modest claim to present only the history of how Britain saw the Middle East (pp. 12–13) turns out to be an understatement, for he integrates many facets of the local context into his narrative, even if only the British are represented in the primary sources.

Throughout the book, the author presents a mostly chronological story, shifting the geographical focus in each chapter. The first chapter is centred on Egypt during and after Napoleon's invasion. It highlights the internal disputes among British actors, as well as their primary objective of defending India against a possible French assault (pp. 22–45).

The second chapter frequently shifts perspective between various British military and diplomatic personnel and representatives of the Levant and East India trading companies. The chapter continues the story of Egypt in the years following the first British intervention, describing the changing coalitions and explaining the British stance in the Egyptian civil war of 1801–12 (pp. 46–57). Later, the focus shifts towards the Red Sea and the pursuit of alternative routes to India, intertwined with the assertion of trading interests (pp. 57–66).

The third chapter delves into the Eyalet of Baghdad. It meticulously describes the power struggles in this Ottoman province and British and Indian efforts to counterbalance French and Russian influence in the region. The stories of two consuls also show how various local groups like the Arabs or Wahhabis were viewed differently by British men on the ground, who valued them not only as pawns in the British power play, but also in a moral context (pp. 80–110).

Chapter four remains in the same region but advances to the 1830s. Britain's main antagonist in the region changes from France to Russia, and Mehmet Ali's impact on British thinking about the Ottoman Empire is explored. Consul Taylor's story exemplifies how British officials tried to keep different powers at bay and improve regional economic development (pp. 111–43).

In chapter five, Parry returns to Egypt and the British relationship with Mehmet Ali. This chapter explores the relationship between Britain and Egypt through economic connections, the protection of Christians, modernization attempts, and the export of ancient cultural assets from Egypt. The chapter also illustrates Jeremy Bentham's philosophical view on Egypt and Ottoman rule, and his impact on British thinking about the region (pp. 144–61). In the later subchapters, the focus shifts to Syria and how the brutal suppression of the rebellion against Mehmet Ali shattered the British image of him as a benevolent despot (pp. 161–73).

Chapter six discusses British involvement in the Oriental Crisis (1839–40) and the reactions to the Tanzimat reforms, which placed high expectations of modernization on the Sultan. It also explains the reasons for the joint intervention against Mehmet Ali (pp. 174–205).

Chapter seven narrates the story of the Anglican mission in Syria and Kurdistan, showing how its efforts were restricted by contestations from Catholics and Ottoman officials, given that Protestantism lacked the status of a millet. Parry describes many attempts to establish lasting contacts with the different sects in the region, as well as the failure to maintain such connections (pp. 206–48).

The theme of protection is picked up again in chapter eight, which is set in Lebanon and particularly addresses the British reaction to the persecution of Nestorians by Kurds. It also investigates the power struggle between Consul Rose (later the assistant ambassador) and

Ambassador Canning, intertwining these stories with the establishment of Henry Layard as an important new actor who worked with different local groups for his archaeological excavations (pp. 249–77).

Chapter nine continues this narrative in Constantinople with Canning as the main protagonist. It explores his efforts to counterbalance Russian influence and establish judicial fairness in Ottoman courts while British consular jurisdiction was expanding (pp. 278–90). In the last subsection, Layard becomes the central figure. Despite becoming a British national hero through his achievements in archaeology, he lost the favour of Canning, who felt his sponsorship was underappreciated by Layard and the wider public (pp. 290–7).

The British influence on trade routes taken by Indian steamships, and British and Russian mediations in the conflict between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, are the subject of chapter ten. Here, Parry illustrates the penetration through trade, but also highlights how British trade relied on local networks and how both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt were able to restrain British efforts (pp. 298–333).

Chapter eleven returns to Egypt and demonstrates that cooperation with France became possible once joint economic interests in the region became strong enough. Despite differing political goals, France and Britain supported the new Khedive Abbas I in similar ways in Constantinople, initiating large infrastructural projects such as the construction of a railway from Cairo to Suez (pp. 334–55).

In chapter twelve, the intellectual pilgrimage of the book concludes in Jerusalem on the eve of the Crimean War. The ongoing disputes over the holy places in Jerusalem, Russian protection of Orthodox Christians, and the refugees of the revolutions of 1848 who escaped to the Ottoman Empire are examined as major factors behind the war. The author further explores the outcome of the war, the 1856 Treaty of Paris. According to Parry's analysis, the formal inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the Concert of Europe did not significantly change international law, but was intended to undermine Russia's symbolic demands. Rather than enhancing respect for Ottoman sovereignty, Westerners interfered more frequently in the empire, which led to increased antagonism with the Muslim population (pp. 356–72).

In the conclusion (pp. 373–404), Parry ties together the many threads he has presented and provides an overview of the impact of

the events described on further developments in the region through to the period of decolonization. In this broader context, nearly all British actors were primarily reacting to 'great European wars' and the actual or perceived 'imperial ambition' of other major powers (p. 403). There was no master plan, but every action triggered long causal chains with a life of their own. Within the time frame of the study, these chains were mostly beneficial for the British. Looking beyond the First World War, however, suggests the opposite. Thus Parry argues that for as long as the British were merely power brokers in the regions, they were able to establish good connections with local groups and outmanoeuvre imperial rivals. Problems arose when they began governing the regions themselves (pp. 399–402).

Overall, Parry's work demonstrates an excellent combination of modern history of mentalities and classical political history, offering significant insights into Ottoman history. The book is primarily based on British sources and acknowledges nearly all significant English-language secondary literature concerning the Ottoman Empire, the British Levant trade, and Franco-British diplomacy and foreign politics. The depth and breadth of Parry's knowledge are impressive. He almost always succeeds in connecting the changing local contexts with the intellectual, political, and economic aspirations of his protagonists within the broader currents of international power politics. He examines the impact of cultural endeavours in archaeology and the powerful imaginings and reimaginings of the biblical and ancient world, which fostered dreams of improvement for the Near East. He also shows how these aspirations often clashed with those in the imperial centres.

Nonetheless, the analytical reasons for the selection of some regions and the exclusion of others remain unclear. Parry's narrative framing of a pilgrimage may partly justify the areas of research. However, some stories, like the excursions to Abyssinia, do not fit within this framework. As Parry acknowledges, given the vast amount of historical sources, a historian, while selecting interesting stories, must also 'try to produce something coherent' (p. 405).

More importantly, however, the study is based exclusively on English-language literature and sources. To use the example of German alone, this limitation means Parry did not consider similar

or complementary studies such as the one by Johannes Berchtold on the British consular justice system.[4] My own study of protection in the Ottoman Empire could also have enriched Parry's conclusion with regard to Layard's additional diplomatic efforts.[5] In terms of sources, Parry thus excludes diplomatic actors from other major powers, like Austria, who were significant brokers in the Ottoman Empire. As Parry himself admits, no Ottoman or Egyptian sources are included; we can assume this has skewed his perspective considerably.

Parry's book is an extensive and detailed study of a vast area and time period, providing in-depth insights into the lives and actions of numerous British, Indian, and Ottoman individuals. Their remarkable stories might have been forgotten if Parry had not chronicled them. However, while reading the book, I often wondered about the motivations behind the actions of these individuals and questioned the overarching thesis of the book. Parry seldom analyses his protagonists' actions, and his conclusion primarily serves as a summary and also a survey of the next hundred years. If Parry's main point is to show that Orientalism is more complex than Edward Said suggested and to reaffirm the principal-agent problem, these insights are not particularly new in this field of study.

In this sense, Jonathan Parry has written a brilliant book that engagingly tells and arranges the stories of nearly forgotten areas and individuals, often employing intriguing metaphors. However, a slightly larger focus on analysis and more daring theses could have elevated this already great contribution to a truly magnificent level.

[4] Johannes Berchtold, *Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der Konsulargerichtsbarkeit: Britische Exterritorialität im Osmanischen Reich 1825–1914* (Munich, 2009).

[5] Wolfgang Egner, *Protektion und Souveränität: Die Entwicklung imperialer Herrschaftsformen und Legitimationsfiguren im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2018).

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ANDREA GRÄFIN VON HOHENTHAL, *Griff nach der Psyche? Psychologie im Ersten Weltkrieg in Großbritannien und Deutschland*, Krieg in der Geschichte, 120 (Paderborn: Brill Schöningh, 2023), x + 609 pp. ISBN 978 3 506 79086 6. €129.00

In her comparative study, Andrea Gräfin von Hohenthal examines the genesis and development of psychology as a science and medical-therapeutic practice during the First World War. Through her examination of the British and German psychological associations and specialist societies of the period, the author traces the individual and group actors who played a central role in shaping the discipline of psychology. In addition, she takes into account the perspective of those who called upon psychological expertise, such as the army and the military administration.

First, von Hohenthal examines psychology's 'formative phase' in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At that time, it was neither a discrete discipline or field of study, nor was it possible to take any course of study—which is why the author defines psychologists as members of the British Psychological Society and the Gesellschaft für experimentelle Psychologie (Society for Experimental Psychology) in Germany, specialist societies that were founded early on (1901 and 1906 respectively). By the mid nineteenth century, psychological knowledge was already being produced and methods were being tested within certain fields. For example, the Medico-Psychological Association (founded in 1865), the successor to the Association of Medical Officers, was open not only to doctors in psychiatric institutions but also to researchers in psychology, such as Charles Myers, who played an important role in the care of injured soldiers during the First World War. Von Hohenthal maintains that, although psychology in the late nineteenth century was an international project, there were as yet no shared conceptual tools nor any common understanding of the principles of psychology. Any international cooperation seemed to be driven purely by the appetite for a new science. Experimental psychology, which had been established in Germany and was increasingly gaining international recognition around 1900, played a particularly

Translated by Marielle Sutherland (GHIL).

important role in the exchange of ideas. The German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig had become the linchpin of this variant of psychology. He attracted students from the Anglo-American world and made sure the programme of scientific experimental psychology was also promoted in Great Britain and the USA.

This development coincided at the end of the nineteenth century with a push for new expertise within various disciplines—for example, medicine, pedagogy, and law. Based on this 'scientification of the social' (Lutz Raphael, cited on p. 37)—undertaken not least by state actors—von Hohenthal interprets the formation of an experimentally oriented psychology as the result of academic discourse and the expectations of policymakers and the public, that is, as a specific epistemological approach. She focuses on the following questions: what role did psychological experts play? What kind of expertise did they bring to the military administration? And which spheres of work were open to psychologists?

Von Hohenthal puts the First World War period, which was a catalyst for scientific psychology, at the centre of her analysis. As well as essays in specialist journals and the records of psychological societies such as the archive of the British Psychological Society, her sources include British and German medical reports and British reports by parliamentary and other committees, such as the 'Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into "Shell-Shock"'. Furthermore, she examines patients' files and psychologists' personal archives, as well as the letters, diaries, and memoirs of patients, drawing on these egodocuments to incorporate their perspective too. Before the war, psychologists did not have any kind of practical function. Only with the outbreak of war did specific fields of activity emerge in either country: in psychiatry and the treatment of soldiers, in the war industry, and in assessments within recruitment processes, particularly for pilots. Charles Myers, for example, became a psychological adviser to the British Armed Forces, and this put him in a position to show that psychologists were indispensable. It was the British Army's openness, or its low level of organization, that offered these windows of opportunity, particularly as the Army Medical Corps played a very limited role before the war. In the German Empire, by contrast, there was a high level of organization in the medical service, giving

psychologists, even in the field of military psychiatry, very limited scope for influence and much less room for manoeuvre. However, their involvement in the treatment of injured soldiers behind the front line enabled German psychologists, too, to play an active role.

In both countries, these new experts were integrated into modern warfare. Psychologists were able to apply their specific knowledge, which was based on the testing and measuring of cognitive and emotional capability. They evidently did not question whether or not they should be contributing to the war effort. In both Great Britain and the German Empire, they assimilated unhesitatingly into the military hierarchy, adopted its concepts of authority, and subordinated the welfare of individual patients to national goals.

The Battles of Verdun and the Somme, which from 1916 caused huge losses of soldiers and materiel, led to the conscription of more and more workers from industry, who were replaced by untrained and female staff. This reorganization of the war economy, and the efficiency problems people feared it would cause, convinced politicians and military administrators to test and implement new methods of assessing workers. Psychologists provided the knowledge and the corresponding methods for selecting suitable candidates, and these techniques remained in demand in both the military and the private sector in the Weimar Republic after the war, whereas the British Army returned to more traditional recruitment processes. Nonetheless, in Great Britain there was still a high level of interest from the private sector.

During the war, psychologists' concepts and views of the causes of 'shell shock' and the appropriate therapies for it also changed. At first, mental disorders were seen as having been caused by the war itself. It was felt that many soldiers and officers were overwhelmed by the enormous levels of death and destruction, the constant physical and psychological stress, and the fact they were not given long enough to recover. In the course of the war, however, and partly because of the increase in pension applications, this belief changed and the illness was attributed more and more to the individual soldier's constitution and disposition. This meant it was no longer the war that was seen as causing mental exhaustion and breakdown, but the weaknesses of the individual. In Germany, this shift in focus

to the individual led to the use of more aggressive treatments such as electroshock therapy in order to make patients fit for work and war again. German psychologists were primarily concerned here, von Hohenthal claims, with getting men back into the war economy. Returning them to military duty was less important, whereas British psychologists were tasked with getting their patients 'fit for the front' (p. 496). The therapeutic approaches employed to this end by psychologists in Great Britain remained rather 'benevolent' (p. 491); they seemed to distance themselves from aggressive therapies. Whether British officers and rank-and-file soldiers were treated equally in this regard remains unclear.

For Great Britain, the picture of war psychology that emerges is to a large extent based on the reports and accounts of officers who were also writers, such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon, who were briefly treated by the psychologist William Rivers at Craiglockhart War Hospital near Edinburgh. Rivers' methods, however, and even the diagnosis of 'shell shock', were highly controversial at the War Office in London, where the view was taken that such patients were merely deserters or malingerers who should not be rewarded—in the case of Craiglockhart—with 'luxuries, golf and tennis' (p. 313).[1] Nonetheless, in Great Britain psychologists like Rivers were able to try out new methods such as talking therapy within military psychiatry.

As well as having practical implications for psychology, the First World War spawned groundbreaking conceptual research in the field. Once the USA joined the war, British thinking was increasingly shaped by American knowledge and ideas. The previously dominant influence of German experimental psychology waned, British psychologists turned their sights west, and Anglo-American psychology began to prevail.

For many psychological experts in Great Britain, the end of the war also meant the end of their work. Posts within universities or the

[1] On Craiglockhart see e.g. Thomas Webb, '"Dottyville": Craiglockhart War Hospital and Shell-Shock Treatment in the First World War', *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 99/7 (2006), 342–46; or Peter J. Leese, 'A Social and Cultural History of Shellshock, with Particular Reference to the Experience of British Soldiers during and after the Great War' (PhD thesis, Open University, 1989).

military were neither continued nor developed. Only three hospitals carried on using and testing psychological and therapeutic knowledge and methods. In industry, psychologists were reliant on the initiatives of individuals who recognized the value of the new aptitude tests and selection processes and wanted to use them in companies.

In Germany, unlike Britain, psychology continued at the institutional level too. Psychological expertise played an important role in the now considerably reduced armed forces. The universities, too, established further professorships and departments in psychology. This post-war period also saw the founding of a psychotherapy society, which distanced itself from the aggressive therapies that had been used experimentally during the war.

Von Hohenthal also traces less obvious continuities that go beyond the period under study through to the Second World War. Ability assessments and aptitude tests applicable on a mass scale formed a subset of psychological knowledge that was continuously employed in Germany in the Weimar Republic and under National Socialism. In Great Britain, by contrast, psychological expertise only made a comeback when the Second World War broke out and it was once again needed in industrial psychology and military aptitude tests. Likewise, psychologists were called upon to share what they had learned about the symptoms of exhaustion and breakdown in military psychiatry during the First World War so that they could help prepare young doctors for the tasks that lay ahead in the coming conflict.

Andrea von Hohenthal successfully demonstrates how the First World War acted as a catalyst in the field of psychology. Psychologists from both countries came together proactively to play an important role in the war effort. Through their broad range of methods—including statistics and questionnaires—they proved their worth in modern warfare as particularly valuable 'modern experts' (p. 495), for example in selection processes for pilots. There was therefore a demand for them in military psychiatry, the war industry, and the armed forces. In both countries, the military needed them to explore, assess, and manipulate the human psyche.

The author also identifies the subtle differences between psychologists and their therapeutic approaches in Great Britain and Germany during and after the war, without losing sight of international

connections. Furthermore, she illustrates the catalysing role of the First World War in terms of the importance attached to psychologists in both countries, which waned, but did not disappear altogether. The psychologists' expertise could be reactivated at any time.

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MIRA L. SIEGELBERG, *Statelessness: A Modern History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 328 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 97631 3. £30.95

Mira L. Siegelberg's study of statelessness as a newly emerging political and legal category of international politics in the twentieth century comes at a moment when refugees are again in the focus of public debates. As the author herself writes in the introduction, unpredictable levels of forced mass migration and the foreseeable, yet still denied consequences of climate change—namely, the vanishing of island states due to rising sea levels—have brought statelessness back to the international agenda. The study aims to analyse why statelessness remained a rather 'hidden' category of international law, politics, and also history, though it was, as Siegelberg seeks to show, a major category around which the architecture of the present international order evolved. To do so, she takes up fresh insights from the historiography of empire, decolonization, and international organizations, which argues that the global triumph of the nation state as the dominant and seemingly non-negotiable form of political organization was not foreseeable until the 1960s. In this way, Siegelberg turns against established readings of contemporary international history that present statelessness as the downside of nationalism and sovereignty. Instead of asking why the international agreements of the post-war years to protect refugees, stateless persons, and human rights in general did not achieve their intended aim, she investigates how these conventions contributed to the creation of the international order after the Second World War.

Siegelberg's approach opens up a set of interesting and productive questions that put the gradual emergence of the relationship between individuals, states, and international law centre stage. She does so by focusing on international organizations and legal scholars. Accordingly, the book is an intellectual history of statelessness dealing with legal theory and scholarly debates, with particular emphasis on Hannah Arendt and Hans Kelsen. The overall argument is that statelessness entered national and international politics only after the First World War, and soon became a contested battleground in efforts to rebalance the relationship between national sovereignty, global governance, and international law. Siegelberg presents the post-1945 era

as the most important period in which these conflicts took legal and political shape. It is therefore surprising that five out of six chapters deal with the decades until 1945, while only the last chapter delves into what she presents as the core development.

Chapters one to three trace how statelessness entered international law and politics. The first chapter analyses a major court decision in 1921 in the UK that established statelessness as a novel legal category. The High Court of Justice ruled in favour of a formerly interned German 'enemy alien' who had sued the UK for failing to acknowledge that he had been stateless before war broke out. As Siegelberg argues, although this case is not representative for several reasons, it was nevertheless decisive, as it introduced a third legal category next to alien and citizen. Moreover, it rejected the previous imperial practice of deciding independently about people's citizenship in favour of the principle that only the country in question can rule whether someone is a national or not. This meant that foreign law was acknowledged as a relevant foundational principle which had to be respected by other states.

As the following chapters show, however, this landmark decision remained vague in important respects. Though it established the sovereign state as the basic unit of international politics, it neglected the variegated practices of imperial governance and remained silent about the relationship between domestic rule and international law. This became the main concern of the League of Nations. Taking the Nansen International Office for Refugees and the break-up of the Habsburg empire as case studies, Siegelberg shows how the need to solve political problems led to differentiation between categories: statelessness, humanitarian intervention on behalf of refugees, and the emergence of new collectives as subjects of international law, such as minorities, mandatories, refugees, and stateless persons. It is interesting to read here how League officials thought of international law as a proper jurisdiction that could take care of stateless persons beyond national law, but at the same time they remained hesitant to infringe upon national sovereignty and thus endanger attempts to establish new principles of international governance.

Chapters four and five deal with the deteriorating international situation from the 1930s onwards, with denationalized Jewish people

as the largest group in need of some kind of national or international protection. In these chapters it is instructive to read how contemporaries struggled to differentiate between refugees and stateless persons. Whereas today this distinction seems to be natural, Siegelberg argues that nationality as a legal and political concept was far from being unequivocally established at the time. Consequently, determining statelessness and the role of international law in regulating nationality became key issues in dealing with forced migration. Siegelberg focuses on The Hague Codification Conference, held in 1930 under the patronage of the League of Nations, which strengthened national sovereignty as the sole instance able to determine nationality and citizenship. Moreover, she demonstrates how legal experts from the US and Great Britain attempted to legally justify Nazi denationalization acts by referring to precedents in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They thus not only confirmed the priority of state practices over international law, but also set out to establish the distinctions between refugees and stateless persons and between national and international competences: refugees had a nationality and thus fell under national jurisdiction, while stateless persons were assigned to international regulation.

Chapter five ties this discussion to human rights. Here, Siegelberg argues that the shift in legal theory to the primacy of national sovereignty was reflected in the limited political effectiveness of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Ironically, European émigré scholars and exile politicians were the main proponents of centring the state in legal theory. They thus supported a legal approach to which they had themselves fallen victim. In practice, the contested meaning of statelessness became relevant when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the International Refugee Organization began to support displaced persons, posing the question of what kind of authority would be tasked with adjudicating conflicts over nationality. Here again, the international protection of stateless persons depended on the question of whether state sovereignty was subject to limits.

The last chapter delves into what Siegelberg presents as the main focus of the book: the nationalization of legal subjecthood, that is, the granting of national and international rights to individuals on the basis

of their having a nationality recognized by a sovereign state. Moreover, she points to the transformation of nationality from a formal, legal political membership to a robust social bond. The author argues that a case before the International Court of Justice in 1955 was crucial in establishing the social quality of nationality as decisive for granting or denying citizenship. She explains the significance of the judgement by turning to decolonization and the fierce debates about the right to self-determination that took place in the same year within the United Nations. For Siegelberg, the ruling was of major importance, as it accepted the creation of stateless persons as collateral damage alongside the higher aim of substantiating national sovereignty as a core principle of international law.

All in all, my opinions of the book are mixed. On the one hand, Siegelberg presents intriguing arguments, and her overall approach of linking statelessness to the development of the relationship between national and international law and the settling of the legal status of individuals, states, and international authorities makes a lot of sense and is illuminating in many respects. On the other hand, the book is a taxing read. This begins with the accessibility of the material used: there is no bibliography or list of archival sources, and the latter are cited in the footnotes in a way that does not facilitate further research. Moreover, the introductory description of the subchapters does not correspond with the actual structure of the book, as for example in chapter five. This opaqueness also extends to the content: contested terms such as 'international society' or 'non-state political order' are used without defining what they mean. More importantly, the main thesis is repeated continuously, while important supporting arguments are not provided. For example, the link to decolonization, presented as a main explanatory feature, remains vague and not sufficiently elaborated. The rise of social bonds as the main criteria for nationality in the post-war period is repeated time and again, but Siegelberg does not attempt to explain why the social became so tremendously important and what stood behind this shift. The same holds true for the turn to national sovereignty in chapter five; this is described, but no arguments are provided beyond the writings of legal scholars, which are unsatisfactorily left to the reader to puzzle out. The book makes a major contribution to the history of international

law and politics in the twentieth century. Yet the argument is exaggerated and it would have been desirable to better contextualize the writings of the legal scholars at the centre of the book and critically assess their impact.

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ANDREW CHANDLER, *British Christians and the Third Reich: Church, State, and the Judgement of Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 422 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 12904 7. £90.00

In this book, Andrew Chandler brings together more than three decades of his own research into the study of how British Christians viewed and interacted with Nazi Germany, returning, indeed, to the subject of his 1991 PhD thesis. This is hardly an unresearched topic; however, most studies have considered individual aspects of what British Christians thought about the 'Church Struggle' (*Kirchenkampf*) in German Protestantism, the British government's appeasement policies, the Nazi persecution of Jews, the Allied war effort and the moral issues raised by Allied victory, or the churches' post-war social policy. Chandler attempts to bring these topics together into a more organic whole. The 'and' in the main title covers a multitude of contexts, whether at the official level—the churches' leadership receives significant attention—or on the part of individual lay thinkers and activists. He focuses on the Church of England and on the substantial, increasingly institutionalized ecumenical movement of the 1930s and 1940s. Mainstream Christian opinion in Britain was clearly, consistently, and adamantly opposed to Nazism; nonetheless, there were sympathies towards aspects of National Socialism to be found in some prominent corners of British Christianity. Overall, Chandler emphasizes the Christian interest in and active support for resistance to Nazism, while exploring the many ambiguities, frustrations, and failures that prevented Christians from acting upon these commitments.

Chandler has organized his thoroughly empirical study chronologically. After a couple of introductory chapters that set the overall scene, provide some background to the interwar period, and introduce key figures in the story to follow, the remainder of the book is broken into sections that consider two- to five-year time spans starting in 1933 and ending in 1949. Without advancing any sweeping or especially bold theses, he uses this approach to methodically reveal the incremental back-and-forth of British–German relations in a tumultuous era. The motive force in this story lies within Germany: British churches are depicted as reactive, being constantly forced to

seek coherent responses to political, social, and military events occurring beyond Britain's shores. Much more space is given to the pre-war period 1933–9 than to the war years that followed. The denominational diversity of British Christianity's intellectual world is made clear: each church had not only its own theological traditions and political affiliations but also varied networks and arenas for intellectual debate (such as journals, meetings, councils, conferences, and so on), and each denomination had different degrees and kinds of relationships with Germany in the decades before the 1930s.

The Church of England is at the heart of this story, particularly at the level of its archbishops (Cosmo Lang and William Temple are the key figures) and bishops. Anglicanism had a particular prominence as the 'national' church, and, not least because of its seats in the House of Lords, it had a distinctive political visibility. As Chandler observes, 'for the most part Free Church opinion did look to the Anglicans to take a lead' (p. 5), the culmination of an increasing friendliness in Protestant relations by the interwar years. Roman Catholics played a much smaller role on the national stage at the start of this period, but in the crises that followed, the church—under the leadership of the Cardinal of Westminster, Arthur Hinsley—increased in both stature and relevance. Some individuals stand out. The bishop of Chichester, George Bell, was one of the most active and knowledgeable Anglican figures with regard to German affairs, and he made several notable interventions in public debates. The bishops of Gloucester (Arthur Headlam) and Durham (Herbert Hensley Henson)—who often clashed publicly over German issues—also receive recurrent attention.

Those Christians who took up the fight against National Socialism had a distinct set of perspectives (p. 33):

> They shared a belief that the Christian church mattered in the world, that it had a responsibility to it and the prospect of influence within it. They found themselves at home in an essentially political milieu because they were sure that they were a defining dimension of it.

These views were common in Christian ecumenism—'one of the great progressive movements of post-war liberal internationalism' (p. 22). Its nascent bodies and networks connected German and British

Christians and coordinated many Christian responses to Nazism. Such contexts are key to Chandler's stress on the transnational dimensions of national historiography. He seeks to present British figures—from bishops and archbishops to ecumenical activists—as *participants* in the internal conflicts of the German churches: 'National Socialism', he emphasizes, 'was not simply a German catastrophe but more truly a part of a wider European crisis' (p. 392). In this emphasis on the participatory role of British Christians in German affairs, Chandler at least implicitly draws a contrast with Tom Lawson's depiction of British Christians as 'bystanders' to the Holocaust.[1]

British churches shared overlapping concerns across the 1930s: the threats posed to the international order, to those resisting the Nazis within Germany, and to Jews. But what could they actually *do*? Above all, they sought to mobilize public opinion through meetings and statements, resolutions by church governing bodies, and commentary in books and periodicals. Church networks were politically well connected, and when opportunities arose—such as during travel to Germany for church gatherings—face-to-face meetings between British churchmen and high-ranking Nazi officials were arranged (though rarely made public). British Christians also organized aid for refugees and, in a more limited sense, for prisoners in Germany through visits to concentration camps.

The Church Struggle involved a set of complicated conflicts—some theological, some political—between those German Protestants willing to submit the faith to Nazi control and those who refused to do so. At first, its contours were ambiguous, and British responses correspondingly mixed. In 1934, the efforts of the 'Confessing Church' to take a more strongly articulated independent position provided a focus for British church action, and the mobilization of international opinion initially bolstered a counter-offensive against the pro-regime *Deutsche Christen* (pp. 134–5). Chandler foregrounds a shifting framework of possibility for British action: the stabilization of Nazi rule made the regime less concerned about foreign opinion, reducing opportunities to exploit internal divisions. Nazi success also

[1] Tom Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust: Christianity, Memory and Nazism* (Woodbridge, 2006), 167.

emboldened their sympathizers (or those at least critical of the Nazis' opponents) in other countries (pp. 139–40).

Apart from the intra-Protestant Church Struggle, the increasingly desperate plight of German Jews was the most prominent recurring issue in British Christian discussions in this period. Chandler identifies residual antisemitism within British Christianity—disproportionately, but by no means exclusively, among Roman Catholics—but insists the Christian 'consensus lay elsewhere' (p. 67). Even so, he recounts statements by leading churchmen, such as the bishop of Gloucester, expressing understanding for the regime's reasoning even if they condemned the persecution that followed from it. Chandler stresses the depths of British Christians' concerns about Nazi antisemitism: public demonstrations against the mistreatment of Jews began in April 1933, and the issue preoccupied the Christian press and church organizations. The official statements by the churches, however, were often curiously mild, a point that some previous historiography has strongly emphasized.[2]

This institutional timidity derived, Chandler shows, not from disinterest but rather from uncertainty about which kinds of intervention would *help* the Jews rather than further endanger them. The resulting strategy of 'sympathetic criticism' meant that official critiques of the Nazis were mixed with praise of the 'new Germany' or even of the regime itself. The concurrent reliance upon their contacts in the Confessing Church was, in turn, stymied by the latter's own ambivalent stance: while adamant about church independence, many in the Confessing Church sympathized with various tenets of National Socialism. Christians were thus hindered in developing an effective *strategy* and had few levers to influence Germany's emerging totalitarian system.

The years of the Second World War are given relatively compact treatment, with a focus on Christian views on the morality of the British war effort, debates concerning 'war aims', and visions of an improved post-war society. Christian pacifist opinion receded, though it remained a small, insistent current. It was more mainstream

[2] E.g. Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity: 1920–1990* (London, 1991), 327, 342–5.

to support the war effort while avoiding the jingoistic nationalism common in the Great War. This consensus suffered under the reports of German atrocities in Poland, the rout of British and French forces, and, of course, as a result of the Blitz; nonetheless, Bishop Bell and others sought to combat 'Vansittartism'—the harshly anti-German views of government adviser Sir Robert Vansittart (later Baron Vansittart)—throughout the war. From 1942 onwards, in the press and in church statements, British Christians condemned reports of the mass killing of Jews. Against some claims that British Christians had failed to sufficiently recognize the unique dangers and suffering of Jews—by folding their struggles into a threat to faith generally or to Christianity specifically[3]—Chandler argues convincingly not only that such an 'alliance of faiths' had been the goal of both British Christians and Jews, but also that in this way much was accomplished in long-term interfaith relations that might not have been anticipated at the time (p. 310).

Discussions about the shape of the post-war society to come led to a flood of new publishing formats. For example, Bell's *Christianity and World Order* (1940) was in fact the first of the popular 'Penguin Specials', Archbishop Temple's *Christianity and Social Order* (1942) was one of the bestsellers of the war, and, starting in late 1939, the *Christian News-Letter* rapidly attracted some 10,000 subscribers. 'Christian ideas', Chandler shows, 'occupied a firm place in the foreground of this broad discourse' (p. 296). Discussions of post-war social reconstruction can be seen as the most successful of the causes around which Christians organized in this period. Social policy and the moral issues involved in the rebuilding of post-war Britain were home territory for the churches, and the broader shift towards 'planning' gave Christians new means to influence society. The churches also threw themselves into meeting the vast needs of post-war humanitarian assistance.

Chandler summarizes the German Church Struggle as 'a vast, diffuse controversy which sprawled untidily, configured and reconfigured, often by the month' (p. 80). This is an apt description of the events related in this book as a whole, and it speaks to Chandler's

[3] Ibid. 345; Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust*, 6, 167.

skills that they are so clearly depicted. British Christians, broadly speaking, flowed with wider cultural currents in Britain: disturbed and concerned about Nazi oppression and violence, rapturous about Munich, inspired (and then deeply disillusioned) by appeasement, patriotically supportive of the war effort (with occasional misgivings about area bombing), and, finally, consumed by visions of a British society after the war that would be better than the one that had entered it. Nonetheless, within such broader commonalities they set their own emphases. Unsurprisingly viewing the age as in the throes of a 'spiritual' crisis, their focus on religious freedom and the role of the sacred in modern societies gave them a distinct standpoint from which to judge politics. As Chandler notes, Christians were already familiar with the language of 'totalitarianism', seeing threats to the rights of Christians as a faith community as part of a wider set of endangered freedoms. (As Markus Huttner has shown, Christians were, indeed, pioneers in such narratives.)[4]

However, the strategy of 'sympathetic criticism' proved a losing and, in retrospect, morally questionable game. Even in November 1935, after the passage of the Nuremberg Laws and in the process of passing a resolution in the Church Assembly condemning the treatment of German Jews, Bell felt the need to reference the 'creative' aspects of Nazism and stress that some of his German friends were committed National Socialists (p. 157). Chandler convincingly refutes the suggestion that British Christians ignored National Socialism or the plight of the Jews. At the same time he shows the many missteps made by church leaders. Ultimately, the churches (like much of the democratic world in the 1930s) seem out of their depth in confronting a force that was immune to—indeed, contemptuous of—appeals to Christian morality. The tools available were simply inadequate to the job.

Nonetheless, this period was a historically important one for Christian social thought, which achieved a creativity, visibility, and relevance that it had at no other point in the twentieth century. The intensity of the British involvement in the Church Struggle, the

[4] Markus Huttner, *Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen: Zur Frühgeschichte totalitarismuskritischer Begriffs- und Theoriebildung in Großbritannien* (Bonn, 1999).

leadership of British Christians in the early years of the ecumenical movement, and, not least, Britain's place as one of the victors in the Second World War ensured that *British* Christians were especially prominent in international Christian dialogues and debates. (The strong relationship between British Christians and the rest of the Anglophone world—including the United States—also contributed to their status, though this is an issue that Chandler addresses only glancingly.) 'National Socialism', Chandler writes, 'drew British Christians into the forefront of a vigorous national discussion about political justice, persecution and war and saw them shaping its terms and trajectories' (p. 390). Christian thought expanded its purview, finding much to say about justice, the social order, and freedom; perhaps more surprising, it discovered that there were many, whether committed Christians or not, who were willing to listen.

This is a masterful and important study that will be essential reading for anyone interested in understanding mid twentieth-century British Christianity.

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ROTEM GEVA, *Delhi Reborn: Partition and Nation Building in India's Capital*, South Asia in Motion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022), 368 pp. ISBN 978 1 503 63119 9 (hardback), $90.00; ISBN 978 1 503 63211 0 (paperback), $30.00

Delhi Reborn is an exceptional work of urban and local history that examines the city within larger frameworks whilst never losing sight of its purpose: to understand how the particular cultural and political histories of Delhi were transformed by the end of empire, the birth of the new nations of India and Pakistan, and the cataclysm of Partition. For the period before these events, Geva's work offers valuable insights into how imaginaries of a new city, and a new nation, were articulated in the interwar period. In particular, the first chapter captures the excitement of these possibilities for understanding and imagining Muslim selfhood. The ideas of Pakistan circulating in the 1930s, communicated in texts and maps, included the city as a place, and more significantly, as an expression of Muslim community that was simultaneously distinct and connected to the broader mores of national politics. The fixing, and restriction, of such ideas in territory came only later. This argument is, of course, a familiar one in general terms: Pakistan meant many things to many people before 1947. Geva, however, succeeds in grounding those ideas in a particular urban, intellectual, and cultural realm, connecting them to lives that belonged entirely within the domain of the city and, indeed, were constitutive of the city in a number of profound ways.

The second chapter maps the violence in Delhi in 1946—the 'abrupt and violent rending of the city's social fabric' (p. 95)—against broader waves of unrest and uncertainty across northern India, and situates the more immediate, local escalation and anticipation of violence in Delhi within a larger history. Geva argues that the violence took on new forms, paving the way for the extraordinary maelstrom of inter- and intra-community violence that accompanied the Partition in 1947. Local organizations armed and trained volunteers, creating new combatants and enabling violence in particular localities. The expansive, inclusive ideas of Pakistan that Geva describes in the first chapter were shrunk back and asserted as defensive calls to arms in the face of immediate threats to personal and collective

safety. *Delhi Reborn* describes the mechanics of the state and the political will that led to anxiety and the restrictions placed on the safety, property, and legitimacy of Muslims in the city. In particular, it traces the role of Sardar Patel, Congress home minister in the interim government which held the power abdicated by the British after mid 1946. Changes in policing and in the coordination of responses to localized violence were critical in creating the conditions for a very new format for communal violence. New Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's voice is heard as a righteous, if ineffectual, witness to the alienation of the city's Muslims.

The third chapter explores particular social and organizational histories that contributed, deliberately and otherwise, to making Muslim inhabitation of the city increasingly insecure and uncertain. Geva demonstrates the constellation of interests of those who constituted the state—politicians, bureaucrats, activists, volunteers, social workers, and the police. She offers a compelling, and unsettling, account of the tensions between Delhi as a symbolic and political centre of the new nation and as a set of inhabited localities from within which responses to the violence, fear, and opportunity were formulated. A terrifying flux was created by attempts to realize Partition, in all its absurdity, by mass migration and ill-formed legislation.

Geva's discussion of literary and journalistic print and textual cultures in the fourth chapter provides a fascinating picture of the dynamic, precarious, and fractious landscapes of identity and belonging that emerged in the years after Partition. The expansive, ambitious imaginaries of the interwar period are replaced by anxious and aggressive narrations of self and other in the new city. The chapter includes a compelling satire—penned by Gopal Mittal in the newspaper *Milap*—of a *Dilliwallah*'s (a long-standing resident of the city) resentment towards people transported from Lahore to Delhi. The evocative piece maps and ridicules the resentment felt by long-term Delhi residents towards the ambitious refugees arriving from Punjab.

The book provides insight into the complexities of thought and action that informed Muslim identities in the city during Partition, including among people who had 'familial and friendly' relations with

those who had made the decision to migrate. Formerly mixed neighbourhoods became exclusionary and treacherous for Muslims, who were becoming the 'other community' within the new nation. *Delhi Reborn* moves between different scales of history, from the broadest canvases of national vision to the microhistories of the *mohalla* (community, neighbourhood). Geva also underlines the importance of class, as the situation for the poorest inhabitants was worsened by prosperous families departing the city on relatively advantageous terms, leaving the poor vulnerable to the lawmakers and enforcers, who were biased towards Hindu refugees.

Notwithstanding the physical violence and ghettoization of Delhi's Muslims, the fifth and final chapter provides perhaps the grimmest reading. It describes the ruptures, augmentation, and continuities in the institutions of policing and intelligence in Delhi between the periods of late colonialism, dominionship, and full independence. In 1951, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Delhi attempted to intercept around 1,700 letters moving between India and Pakistan. Geva describes this action, along with the CID's targeted surveillance and harassment of those classified as potential or actual threats to the new, democratic political order. The lens of the state shifted to include new enemies: socialists, communists, and labour organizers.

The book ends with an epilogue, rather than a conclusion. This briefly summarizes the popular agitations against the Citizenship Amendment Act and the farmers' protests between 2019 and 2021, presenting the continuing tension between the 'authoritarian instincts and democratic aspirations' (p. 263) that are so vividly presented in the proceeding chapters.

Geva avoids shorthand simplifications, offering instead a meticulously researched history that helps us to understand the rhizomic complicity of local politics in a city that was a theatre for national politics and, perhaps, a reluctant capital. This can lead to some dense prose and occasional tangents from what had appeared to be the principal lines of argument. Nevertheless, this book richly rewards the reader with its insight, scope, and eye for detail. *Delhi Reborn* succeeds in making plain just how much was lost to the city, and in turn to both nations, in the division of India and Pakistan. The book is more,

however, than a chronicle of loss. It is a work that articulates a passion for the city of Delhi; in its pages lie not only the history of violence, but also glimpses of a city that endures despite the inadequacies of the political and bureaucratic machinery it has long sustained.

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RONNY GRUNDIG, *Vermögen vererben: Politiken und Praktiken in der Bundesrepublik und Großbritannien 1945–1990*, Geschichte der Gegenwart, 28 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2022) 340 pp. ISBN 978 3 835 35169 1. €32.00

Social inequality has once again become a contentious societal issue in the wake of Thomas Piketty's work, if not before.[1] Unlike in the past, however, the contemporary debate has centred on the end of the income and wealth spectrum that has previously attracted less attention—in other words, on the rich. This new focus soon raises questions around inheritance, which makes a significant contribution to maintaining structures of social inequality across generations.

Inheritance as a process extends far beyond the individual and is a worthwhile subject for social history. However, contemporary historians have paid it far less attention than scholars of other eras. Only in the last few years has German historiography taken a greater interest in this form of wealth transfer, and Jürgen Dinkel in particular has done much to advance the research field.[2]

Now Ronny Grundig has developed it further in his PhD thesis, written at the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam. His study focuses on the period from 1945 until 1990—an end point chosen because of the subsequent changes to discourses and structures of inequality brought about by German reunification. Grundig compares the Federal Republic of Germany to the UK, justifying his selection of countries by their different legal systems. His analysis centres on three points: first, the regulation of inheritance by the state; second, changes to inheritance practices on both sides—that is, among testators as well as heirs; and third, how the process of inheritance shaped the social and economic fabric of the Federal Republic.

The part dealing with political history is the most straightforward. Chapters one and two outline the legal context over the period, with more space given to the early post-war years. This unequal weighting

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Translated by Jozef van der Voort (GHIL).

[1] Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2014).
[2] Jürgen Dinkel, 'Erben und Vererben in der Moderne: Erkundungen eines Forschungsfeldes', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 56 (2016), 81–108.

makes sense, given that the aftermath of the Second World War opened a window for change in both nations. In the UK, change consisted primarily of substantial tax rises in accordance with the legislative goal of redistributing wealth in the post-war settlement. In West Germany, the Allies—and especially Great Britain—made significant interventions in tax law. Previously, inheritance tax rates had varied based on how closely related the heir was to the testator. This system was replaced with a single standardized rate, which placed a substantial burden on smaller estates. The resulting legislative similarity between both countries was short-lived, however, as the Bundestag repealed the reform in its very first session. This shows how significant an issue inheritance tax was, given the large number of important legislative projects competing for attention at this time—a situation that prompted some contemporaries to call the Bundestag a 'working parliament' (*Arbeitsparlament*). For the UK, Grundig extends his discussion into the 1970s, thereby considerably stretching the definition of 'post-war'. Yet this is necessary to cover key aspects of the British inheritance debate—notably, efforts to safeguard widows.

Chapter two then traces the regulation of inheritance up to 1990. Here, Grundig places more emphasis on the similarities between his case studies than the differences. The high rate of inheritance tax in the UK did not bring about the redistribution hoped for by legislators. There were many other wealth transfer routes to choose from, and although attempts were made prior to Margaret Thatcher's election to close loopholes, they achieved little. Labour politicians introduced a capital transfer tax in order to skim off private wealth and divert it to the treasury, but their efforts were thwarted by the change in government. After 1979, estates benefited from the concept of the property-owning democracy, which produced a fall in the rate of inheritance tax, among other effects. This development is certainly in keeping with the standard view of the Thatcher era; however, there is still a need to explain why the lively debate over increasing inheritance tax had so little influence on legislation. The same goes for the Federal Republic, where voices were also raised in support of a higher rate of inheritance tax as a counter to growing wealth inequality. Yet the German inheritance tax reform of 1973 was moderate in scope, despite the extensive demands made by the left wing of the Social

Democratic Party (SPD). While there was no radical policy of redistribution under the SPD, there was no clear neoliberal turn either.

In the third and fourth chapters the focus shifts onto inheritance practices. Grundig's source base switches from parliamentary debates, politicians' personal archives, and committee minutes to tax and probate records and corporate archives. The UK case fades into the background in this section—presumably for practical reasons, which are all too understandable given the time pressures faced by most doctoral students. Comparative social history is generally far more challenging than studying political decision-making, as working with case files is very labour-intensive. Nonetheless, it would have been desirable for the author to reflect more openly on his analytical context. That said, Grundig's social historical inquiries have resulted in some of the most interesting findings in his book. Only a quarter to a third of testators opted to actively transfer their wealth instead of bequeathing it according to inheritance laws. The extent of a person's wealth generally determined whether they would write a will, but in some cases less wealthy people also chose to do so—for example, to leave money to their carers.

The most important empirical findings relate to the dominance of families, the formation of a labour market around inheritance, and the complexity of transferring wealth. People generally chose to actively transmit their property to family members, in particular their spouses. In many cases, inheritance involved a number of actors besides the testators and heirs, such as notaries, executors, and heir finders. The inheritance tax records show that intergenerational wealth transfers took place beyond the confines of inheritance law, especially when it came to large fortunes. Gifts and other methods of transmitting property must also be taken into account in order to understand the full picture.

All in all, Grundig has produced a source-centred study that synthesizes information from case files, parliamentary records, sociological and legal studies, and personal archives into a readable whole. Some clever planning was evidently required to accommodate the broad array of topics—taking in large and small estates, testators, heirs, and two countries—within the confines of a single book. And it is ultimately for the best that the transnational comparison fades into

the background as Grundig immerses himself in the social history of inheritance. However, in certain places more in-depth discussion would have been welcome—for instance, on why inheritance tax remained so modest in West Germany, especially when compared to the higher rates in the UK and the USA. Also, coming back to the third of the three major questions raised at the beginning of his study—that of the significance of inheritance for the social and economic fabric of the Federal Republic—Grundig could have discussed more what his findings regarding inheritance practices mean for the history of the family or old age. An answer to some of these questions should be forthcoming from the array of existing and soon-to-be-published research on inheritance in the twentieth century.[3]

[3] See e.g. Jürgen Dinkel, *Alles bleibt in der Familie: Erbe und Eigentum in Deutschland, Russland und den USA seit dem 19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2023).

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SARAH COLVIN, *Shadowland: The Story of Germany Told by Its Prisoners* (London: Reaktion Books, 2022), 280 pp. ISBN 978 1 789 14627 1. £25.00

Anyone who believes that everything essential about the history of the Federal Republic of Germany has already been written should read this book by British literary scholar Sarah Colvin. Colvin is the Schröder Professor of German and a Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. So she is not a historian. And it is particularly important to emphasize this because her carefully researched study makes an extremely important contribution to the history of the Federal Republic of Germany that no one has written before, and perhaps no one has wanted to read. *Shadowland* is an uncomfortable book. It examines West German society from the perspective of those whose very existence is not mentioned, even in passing, in the standard histories of the Federal Republic: the people in prison. A section on the GDR shows the extent to which the penal system in East Germany had parallels in the West. Colvin does not write about well known prisoners such as Red Army Faction founder Ulrike Meinhof, whose writings she has analysed in another book on how terrorism takes root.[1] Instead, she takes up the 'stories of the "little people" in prison' (p. 10) and shows the extent to which these stories express the history of an entire country. Very different people have their say: women and men, Black people and people of colour, rarely also disabled and elderly people.

Colvin states that her book 'is the story of Germany told, as far as possible, in the words of people in prison' (p. 10), and this certainly makes it a 'different' history of the Federal Republic. Colvin deserves credit for writing it. However, it was inspired by Ralf Dahrendorf, who emphasized in the mid 1960s in his book *Society and Democracy* that 'adequate witnesses' for the liberal, democratic constitution of West German society were not politicians or lawyers, but 'foreign workers, mentally ill, [and] prison inmates'. This is because outsiders are particularly good at documenting 'what is happening in a society'.[2] In order to show what was happening in West German society, Sarah

[1] Sarah Colvin, *Ulrike Meinhof and West German Terrorism: Language, Violence, and Identity* (Rochester, NY, 2009).

[2] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (London, 1968), 351. First published in German in 1965.

Colvin has organized her book into four chronologically arranged parts, one of which deals with living conditions in the GDR penal system. The sources used are mainly letters and memoirs written by prisoners, with the GDR section—inevitably—drawing on memoirs published after 1989. The immediacy of the letters on which the other parts are based is therefore found only to a limited extent here.

One common thread in *Shadowland* is the experience of violence. In part one, 'Unity, Rights and Freedom: West Germany, 1949–68', readers meet Germans—mostly children—who had lost both parents in the war and were wandering around alone, stealing in order to survive. Many of them ended up in institutions, where they were beaten and often abused. Their life stories, as becomes clear in *Shadowland*, reflect the story of a society that was not really interested in the fate of the 'rubble children'. Many of those who experienced such a 'mid-century childhood' (p. 45) were never able to lead law-abiding lives. Their 'careers' on the streets and in closed institutions also determined their future development. *Shadowland* reports on these often very personal experiences and draws on sources such as the collection of letters assembled by the Swedish publicist Birgitta Wolf (1913–2009), who lived in Germany from 1933. As Carin Göring's niece, Wolf had good contact with prominent representatives of the Nazi state. At the same time, she began campaigning on behalf of prisoners and concentration camp inmates in the 1930s and continued this commitment after the end of the war. By the early 1960s she had already received 6,000 letters from prisoners. By the time of her death she had amassed 60,000 letters, some of which are now in the archives of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research and have been published.[3] All the letters that Sarah Colvin quotes in this section point to a fundamental problem: 'Continuity, rather than change, is the leitmotif in stories from the post-war prison' (p. 30). Apparently, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners signed by the UN in 1955, which strictly prohibited any form of violence behind bars, did nothing to prevent physical abuse of all kinds from determining the everyday lives of prisoners.

In the social liberal reform years from 1968, when the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to 'dare more democracy' (in Willy

[3] Birgitta Wolf (ed.), *Die vierte Kaste: Junge Menschen im Gefängnis. Literarische Dokumente* (Hamburg, 1963).

Brandt's famous formulation), prisons also became the subject of reform. Sarah Colvin describes these developments in part two ('A Model and Looking Good? West Germany, 1968–89') without any sugar-coating, because her material—letters from another generation of prisoners—gives no reason to do so. In 1976 the Prison Act was passed, a law that was intended to grant rights to prisoners and which stood at the end of a long reform process that aimed to achieve the goal of rehabilitation through educational and socio-psychological means. In those years, the Federal Republic was certainly looking to Northern Europe and the Scandinavian model, which allowed prisoners more freedom and led to recognizably lower recidivism rates. However, this model was not implemented in the Federal Republic. Prisoners certainly realized this and were often stunned by how much was said about rehabilitation and how little of the supposed spirit of reform reached the prison walls. In this section, we learn about issues such as sexual distress, sexual violence, and homosexual seduction, which women encountered more than men and of which they were generally ignorant and fearful. There is also an impressive description of what it meant to be a transgender prisoner in a men's prison (and not to survive). It is as sobering as it is remarkable that self-harm and suicide were apparently the only possible form of self-empowerment for many of the prisoners. The fact that a supposedly liberal law granting prisoners educational and socio-psychological treatment as well as extended personal rights was passed at this time sheds a different light on the often-cited success story of the Federal Republic. Progress and stagnation could apparently stand side by side, and this contradiction is therefore just as much a part of the history of the West Germans as their supposedly straightforward path to a 'better world'.

The third part, 'Risen from the Ruins: East Germany, 1949–89', makes it clear from the outset that no account written by a prisoner of the GDR was published in East Germany during the forty years the state existed. One exception is the *Hohenecker Protokolle*, based on interviews with former inmates of the infamous women's political prison.[4] Ulrich Schacht, who conducted the interviews, epitomizes the brutality of the GDR penal system more than almost anyone else. He was born

[4] Ulrich Schacht (ed.), *Hohenecker Protokolle: Aussagen zur Geschichte der politischen Verfolgung von Frauen in der DDR* (Zurich, 1984).

in Hoheneck and was taken away from his mother, Carola Schacht, when he was just a few weeks old—a completely normal fate for mothers and their newborns in East German jails. Readers also learn about the experiences of Black GDR citizens in prison, as well as the arbitrariness, violence, and hopelessness that characterized life behind bars. The situation improved somewhat with the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and the GDR's new Penal Code of 5 May 1977, which consigned to history at least the worst instruments of torture, such as standing cells and water cells. This development was hardly reflected in the prisoners' stories, however. Even after the reforms, imprisonment meant that most people had to give up their personal rights completely. 'Foucault could not have known it', Colvin writes, 'but even before he famously revisited Jeremy Bentham's panoptical vision of the prison in *Discipline and Punish* (1975), East German prisoners were experiencing prison as a reflection of the panoptical or all-seeing state' (p. 147).

'Wind of Change: Germany after 1989' is the title of the fourth and final section, which left this reader in disbelief. Colvin jumps forward to the present and reports that even in 2020, there are still communal cells in German prisons that do not have a separate toilet area and therefore do not guarantee a minimum degree of privacy. What Sarah Colvin has emphasized in the stories of prisoners since the post-war period still applies today: 'over and over again, the story of people in prison is the story of not being believed' (p. 55). Regardless of how they are treated and what they have to suffer, they are hardly considered credible. Peter-Paul Zahl called the fate of people in prison 'nobodification' in 1977, a term that is obviously still relevant today (p. 173). Not being heard and seen is reminiscent of what Johan Galtung dubbed 'structural violence' in the late 1960s. Structural violence, according to his conceptualization, is the avoidable impairment of basic human needs or, to put it more generally, of life, which reduces the actual degree of satisfaction of needs below what is possible.[5] It is 'built into the system and manifests itself in unequal power relations'.[6] As much as the prisoners' letters express these unequal power

[5] Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6/3 (1969), 167–91.

[6] Johan Galtung, *Strukturelle Gewalt*: *Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), 9.

relations in the past, Colvin's book also makes it clear that it would be wrong to believe that a transformation has taken place in the institutions of the Western world since the 1970s. On the contrary, prisons are still violent places today. Prisoners kill and are killed behind bars. The drug trade also flourishes behind prison walls. And people who have been in prison for a long time are not rehabilitated, but fear that they will no longer be able to live in freedom. Giving these people a voice and showing the extent to which writing can be a form of self-assertion is one of the great merits of Sarah Colvin's book. Another is that it inspires Germans to reflect on their country. The experiences of prisoners leave no doubt that the development of West German society, although it has largely succeeded politically and legally in (re)building a democratic community after the 'shock of inhumanity',[7] cannot adequately be described with the still frequently invoked narrative of 'liberalization'.[8] 'Most of us prefer to believe we live in a (more or less) rational modern democracy. But stories from prison say: this is not the country you thought it was' (p. 22).

[7] Konrad H. Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995*, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford, 2006), 5 .

[8] Ulrich Herbert, 'Liberalisierung als Lernprozess: Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte—eine Skizze', in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen, 2002), 7–49.

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REET TAMME, *Wissenschaft und 'race relations': Repräsentationen von Multiethnizität in Großbritannien 1950–1980* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), vii + 411 pp. ISBN 978 3 110 79057 3. £82.00

The book begins with a focus on Sheila Patterson's study *Dark Strangers*, published in 1963.[1] Although the title of this study is based on Georg Simmel's concept of the 'stranger',[2] this choice of words is hardly conceivable in the social sciences today as a reference to minorities and migrants. This is precisely why it is impressive to see how far these disciplines have come since then, and Reet Tamme's PhD thesis, which she wrote at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, guides readers along this path from the 1950s to the 1980s.

In her introduction, Tamme describes British race relations research as a 'new system of knowledge production and a new representation system for ethnicity' (p. 2). This is linked to the broader question of whether and how the social sciences help structure social reality, following Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.[3] At the same time, Tamme states that the social sciences themselves are subject to social change. This has an additional transnational dimension in the case of British race relations research: according to Tamme's thesis, US research provided the decisive theoretical foundations over several decades.

The source base of Tamme's work largely comprises social science publications, in particular from the Chicago School and from the Institute for Race Relations (IRR), which was founded in London in 1958. It also includes reports, organizational charts, and correspondence from the IRR's committees and from the Ford Foundation as a significant third-party funder. These are taken from the institute's and foundation's own archives in London and New York and from the Black Cultural Archives in London, the London Metropolitan Archives, and the National Archives in Kew. Methodologically, Tamme uses a

[1] Sheila Patterson, *Dark Strangers: A Sociological Study of the Absorption of a Recent West Indian Migrant Group in Brixton, South London* (London, 1963).

[2] Georg Simmel, 'The Stranger', in Georg Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writings*, ed. Donald N. Levine (Chicago, 1971), 143–9. This essay was first published in German in 1908.

[3] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY, 1966).

model of discourse analysis that includes texts and institutionalized practices. In addition, she draws on Lutz Raphael's notion of the 'scientification of the social',[4] since British race relations research has had a strong social reform impulse from the very beginning.

The first chapter is dedicated to the establishment of race relations research in the USA and Great Britain from 1920 to 1960. Tamme provides a detailed overview of the works of the Chicago School and the refutation of the 'scientific' concept of race by Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and others. Although these outlines are largely known, they are skilfully summarized here. Gunnar Myrdal, who understood race as socially constructed and race problems as socially caused, plays a central role in Tamme's portrayal. What was notable, however, was that from the 1940s onwards a greater conceptual distinction was drawn between race (for African Americans) and ethnicity (for European immigrants) in the US social science literature. These semantics have also been relevant to the situation in Great Britain since the introduction of the Nationality Act of 1948, which recognized Commonwealth citizens as British citizens. The interest in the living conditions of this new category of citizens was the starting point for British race relations research.

Tamme convincingly places this emerging field in the global context of late colonialism, as well as in the historical context of science. Academic sociology was still not very well developed in Great Britain, and American theoretical impulses were therefore readily adopted. Applied social reform predominated until the 1960s, while early studies of prejudice and discrimination were already highlighting social insecurities and the question of British identity. More powerful, however, for race relations research was the emergence of several paradoxes: on the one hand, the particular needs of immigrants were overlooked because they were officially considered 'ordinary citizens' (p. 112); and on the other, social reform goals often led to the negative singling out of immigrants by discursively creating new stereotypes and prejudices that were applied to the 'Black' population, and by constructing distinctions between 'British' and 'foreign'. It was also

[4] Lutz Raphael, 'Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 22/2 (1996), 165–93.

increasingly recognized as a problem at the time that 'White' social scientists were studying 'Black' communities, even if they saw themselves as their advocates.

The second chapter deals with the institutionalization of race relations research in Great Britain at the beginning of the 1960s. The widely publicized riots in Notting Hill in 1958 stimulated activities that aimed to improve race relations. These included the founding of academic institutes and departments of urban sociology, and especially the IRR in London. The IRR's Board of Studies included not only scientists but also businesspeople who invested in the British colonies, and the institute's director, Philip Mason, was also a former colonial official. The IRR had its headquarters in the affluent neighbourhood of St James and published its monographs with Oxford University Press. Tamme pointedly judges that in the IRR, an elite from the worlds of science, business, and politics controlled the production of knowledge about race relations.

Transatlantic ties remained strong: the Ford Foundation was an important third-party donor, and the IRR also entered into collaborations with the University of Denver and the University of California, Berkeley. Above all, however, its major project of undertaking a 'survey of race relations' was explicitly intended to build on an American model and to become a 'Myrdal for Britain' (p. 173), with reference to Myrdal's influential study *An American Dilemma*.[5] In 1969, the survey was published under the title *Colour and Citizenship*.[6]

However, the 1960s also brought a shift towards a more specifically British approach to race research. Immigration from South Asia came into focus, and multi-ethnicity gradually established itself as a new interpretive pattern for British society, while the idea of assimilation lost importance. At the same time, immigrant groups were increasingly seen as stable units whose well-being should be promoted. Such essentialization was one of the paradoxes of race relations research. Nevertheless, it had a political impact, in major laws such as the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act and especially the Race Relations

[5] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York, 1944).

[6] E. J. B. Rose et al., *Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations* (Oxford, 1969).

Act of 1965, which brought a series of anti-discrimination regulations into force earlier than elsewhere in Europe.

Children and young people also came into focus in the 1960s. It is estimated that around 170,000 children were classified with terms such as 'immigrant children' or 'second-generation'. This made education in a multi-ethnic environment a new topic for research. While the teaching of English as a second language was established smoothly in schools, there were other controversies: alongside criticism of textbooks that still conveyed colonial worldviews, there was a demand for more Black teachers. Furthermore, in some schools, quota regulations allowing 'non-White' children to make up no more than one third of each class were tried out, as was the bussing system known from America. Finally, special classes were set up, primarily for Afro-Caribbean children.

Chapter three, which addresses the pluralization of the research field from the beginning of the 1970s, offers very pointed descriptions of various crises. Enoch Powell's infamous 'rivers of blood' speech from 1968 stood against the growing influence of the 'Black Power' movement, while in science, so-called radical sociology forced the 'emergence of new theoretical approaches as a counter-representation' (p. 265). In the IRR, these challenges became particularly acute. A new generation of scientists came onto the scene who saw themselves as radical academics. They stood for an epistemic commitment that was openly political, in contrast to the previously claimed 'neutrality' of the IRR. Criticism quickly arose in response to the IRR's flagship study *Colour and Citizenship*, and Black communities who featured in it as research subjects were called on to resist: 'When researchers from the IRR come knocking on their doors for information they will be well advised to tell them to fuck off' (p. 273). Radical scientists now often spoke of a 'race relations industry' and 'scientific colonialism' (p. 273), while Marxist approaches and a reckoning with capitalist structures were very popular.

This new era at the IRR was also reflected in its symbolism and practices. The institute's headquarters were moved from St James to the King's Cross area—closer to Black communities—and the scholarly magazine *Race* was renamed *Race and Class: A Journal for Black and Third World Liberation*. A comprehensive change in personnel also

took place in the committees: political and economic elites gave way to activist representatives of Black communities and Marxist scholars. This reorganization had consequences. The Ford Foundation ended its funding of the IRR and instead focused on individual projects and scientists in Great Britain. In Tamme's judgment, this marked the end of a period of intensive knowledge transfer between the US and Britain. British cultural studies, which were largely influenced by Stuart Hall, embarked on an independent approach in which culture was understood as everyday practice and great attention was paid to media theory. Racism was not to be analysed as a universal phenomenon, but rather in a specific historical context.

In her last chapter, Tamme takes a systematic look at knowledge production and its modes, discussing several models from the sociology of knowledge. She concludes that race relations research evades a traditional disciplinary history because it did not develop any specifically dedicated courses or chairs during the period under investigation. In addition, it imported its methods predominantly from the USA and was characterized by disciplinary heterogeneity and the increasing participation of non-academic representatives, as well as a high level of practical relevance.

Reet Tamme's book shows the change in representations of multiethnicity very convincingly, but the parts dedicated to race relations research as a new system of knowledge production have somewhat less momentum. The fact that science should not be understood as a teleological process has already become established in the history of knowledge. Although she shows that interdisciplinarity took root earlier than previously assumed, Tamme does not establish a parallel with Anne Kwaschik's book on the emergence of area studies, which showed precisely this.[7] In general, Tamme deals well with theories and models of the sociology of knowledge, but engages less often with the historical research literature.

One of the methods of the history of knowledge is to shed light on the biographical characteristics of the actors involved. Tamme does this only for a few actors, and in a brief manner. This reluctance is

[7] Anne Kwaschik, *Der Griff nach dem Weltwissen: Zur Genealogie von Area Studies im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2018).

particularly regrettable in the case of two social scientists, Ruth Glass and Marie Jahoda. Born in Berlin and Vienna, they had to emigrate in the 1930s because of their Jewish origins and their political commitments. Against this background, it would have been interesting to find out whether and to what extent both of them also brought Continental European experiences with 'race' and racism into British race relations research. This question is also of interest because the translation of terms and concepts is a recurring issue in Tamme's work. In her German text, Tamme uses the term 'ethnicity' where American social scientists were still speaking of 'race', and she uses 'multi-ethnic' when British social scientists were evoking the vision of a 'multi-racial Britain'. After all, Tamme points out that in Great Britain too, the term 'ethnicity' increasingly replaced 'race' and became partly interchangeable with it—in contrast to developments in the USA which are shaping current racism research.

Debates like these show the great advantage of studies of the history of knowledge, such as that by Reet Tamme. They offer the insight that many of the challenges, tensions, and perspectives encountered today in the scientific discussion about migration and racism have been around for decades and have—sometimes forgotten—forerunners and pioneers. They show which paths were taken back then, and which are no longer being pursued today. With her detailed presentation of institutionalized practices, Tamme also offers fascinating insights into the British research landscape on late colonialism, decolonization, and the Commonwealth. These findings seem all the more powerful because Tamme refrains from political commentary and pointed argument. This pronounced objectivity is also stylistically beneficial, since well-chosen source quotations and praxeological micro-insights provide fine narrative counterpoints to the otherwise sober tone of the book. This thoroughly crafted and very readable study is indispensable to any future research work on migration, race, and ethnicity, as well as the history of knowledge and the contemporary history of Great Britain.

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